










NAFCOC, the State and National-Democratic Struggle 
Dissertation submitted in Part1al completion of the degree of BA 
(Honours) in the Department of Economic History~ UCT. 
By F'J Hope 
~(... \\\ S'\e~t 'the University of CiJ!lC Tewn 
he Dept o .. . th•s T . ri ht to re!)roou,.t: 
hall been g•ven the ~ . . 
. h le •r ,n >l"rt. 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 











Con t ~ n t. .. §L __ ·---·----·--·····-·····-·····-·· ············-·--····-·--··-····-·--·-···-······--··---·-··-·-············-··-·······-·-·-·····-·····-·-··-·--·····-·-·--·-···---·-··-······-·-------·--·· ·······--···--··-··--···E'§g_~ ... ..J~.9.-~ ... 
Acknowle\jqement·:; 
List of Abbreviations 
h_j..o.!;, r 0 d _l:!_~,.t_.:!_g_o.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
2. Tf1§1.Q.!: .. ~t i .<;.~J_. ___ .Q.i.2.£;_1,.,!..!?._?..t...9.IL .. ::. .... c; .. L£1?..?. ...... £11J..g ___ ..r.._@y.QJ...l::~.t.tgo .••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • 4 
2a. The nature of class and implications for political practice •.•.• 4 
2b. "Colonialism o+ .:3. Speci<::t1 Typen and poU.t.ic:-:3.1. :;t;~a.tegy ..•...•.• :~() 
3 • T q_ t a J_§ t r ate _gy ____ :=_§.:tS~.!:..§ ____ ~o...!;;I ...... G.§fLLt .. ~_l_tl an o u §.Y..r e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 23 
3a .• Tr·le ;·.,.!i l i t..3.F"~:l i""lonopc:>1 }/ ;"~11 i ance tctke::.; Si-la.~Je:: II II u II II II a II II II II 11 II II II. II~ II 2~:. 
3b. Total Strategy and its Implementation ••••.•..••..•.•••....•... 30 
3c. Frain F\i ekei·-t tc> F;-~~::;c~·:::: R u It II II M II u II u :1. • II • u ll II " II .. II u II " II II ll II II II II u :a n II u II u II II • "::::~:; 
5. J~B.E~~_Q_G ___ ~_Q_Q. __ !. .. t..?. ....... r..~_c; .. ~.o._t.._ .. b ... ~ ... ?.J·:.9..~ .. Y .. !!-.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 
5a.u !"'·~i~~FCi:JC: t.hf:"? CJi·-q.:3.ni·::::.a.tic•n" If It. n II a"."" u II" n u II II D :1 II II II D. IJ II 1:1 a II It. 1111 II". II. u51 
5bll I~AFCOC='·:; ,,..ecent hi·::;t.cJt-'(~ -:3. C-:?.i."3E~ cJ+ log·-·j--(JJ.lir·lqn II II w II .. II II" n II II II II II II 11:5{.) 
~-TD.§ .... r.::.~.9.:L£;.~ . .t! ... ?..~.t! ... QIJ._.9..:L ... tb..§L.~-?.P . ..:i.c .. ~.IJ.t.. ..... !;l_g~,.~cg_~g_:i,__'§_.L~. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 78 
6a a tf r···~?'4f-7 C:CJC:: !TICJ\/2:::. 1 t?·~-= til n n A 11 II II II U S1 n a 11 A a 11 11 u 11 11 11 11 U 11 11 11 11 11 11 u :a :l n IS n II S1 n It A II :1 1: II II "lc,;: 
6b. On the ground: tracers in the townshios •....••.......•..••..... 89 
6c II A -=~ i -~~c:: Ll"5 5 i CJn CJ--f t. he nat. U.i·- t? CJ-f the 11 1.- ad"j_ c:: a 1 i ·::.:-~:1-t. i C}!l !! D r·i en ornert C1n II n '?·~:.; 
h~Q.Q.~_!J::-~2..!_Q.[1_ a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a • • • • • • a • a a a • a a • a a • a • • • • a a • • a a • • • • a a a • • a • 1 (:) 8 
Appendi;-~ :t 
Appencii~< .. ~.: 
B iJ:tLtgg_cE.:.Qh.Y.. 
Breakdown of representative sample of NAFCOC members oy 
OCCIJ.iJ.::ition 
First and foremost to the Econom1c History deoar~ment for giving me 
the space to ooerate in my particularlY disorganised fashion, 
especially to Ian Ph1m1ster for his patience anc co-operation and to 
Giil Curllng for the endless message-running she did on my behalf. To 
Chris Giffard great thanks for the time he took reading drafts and 
the support he gave when things were looking tense. 
To all those who submitted themselves to my interviews - I hooe you 
enjoyed them half as much as I did. An especial thanks to Mashudu 
Ramano for running around in Johannesburg arranging access to NAFCOC 
material, and to Mark Swilling far his insights in the area and the 
information he could provide. A thank you would be in order to Dr 
Motsuenyane, to Mr Willie McBain-Charles and to Mr Yusuf Pahad for 
the time they took away from their busy schedules to answer often 
rhetorical questions. 
Thank you to my numerous and varied housemates for tea, coffee, 
debate, perspective etc. 
To Clive Stramrood for the trouble he took to get me in contact with 
NAFCOC leadership. 
Thanks also to Richard Goode and Carol Abramovitz for tne use of 
their printers in emergencies. 
I must acknowledge NAFCOC for the unambiguous way it scuttled the 
Nati on;al Sta.tu.tol·-·y' C_ounc 1l a.nd initially a.n:lU5i:::•cJ my j_ nte1rest. i'"iay my 
predictions pay off! 
Finally we must stand in resoect of those millions who since the 
appearance of white domination have struggled and died to regain 
their birthright~ all those who have fallen in recent battles~ and 
all who continue to take forward that just cause. 
Without the inspiration of their sacrifice this work would be 
meaningless. 
Aluta de classe continua! 
Victoria e certa 1 
List of Abbreviations 
ANC - African National Congress 
ASS(~ 

















- Association for Sociology in Southern Africa 
- Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
- Bopnuthatswana Chamber of Commerce 
- Cap1talist mode of production 
- Congress of South African Trade Unions 
·-· "Colonialism c;f a. Special Type" 
Joint Monitc;ring Centre 
Journal of Sc;uthern African Studies 
National African Chamber of Commerce 
National African Federated Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry 
- National Transvaal Regional Convention 
- National Education Crisis Committee 
South African Labour Bulletin 
- South African Research Service 
Southern Transvaal Chamber of Commerce 
Urban Councils Association of South Africa 
United Democratic Front 
Urban Foundation 
United States Agency for International 
Deo..;e:L opmF::nt 
1 
This paper covers three broad areas of work. all of wn1ch relate to 
the problem of u~derstanding the oolitical position of what has been 
called in this oaoer African bourqeoisie' 
state and capital refer to as the 'Black middle class'. 
1s imoortant to clarify the analytical tools we use to 
,... . . 
1...11 SCUSSl on class· that intiates 
the pacer will help avoid misunderstanding. 
A large part of this dissertation consists of a review of orthodox 
hi st.m- i c:a.l anal y·:;;i s o·f the South Af ri c.:1.r1 soc i a.l 
formation, and of revolutionary strategy generally. I~ is felt that 
the depth of this section will prevent a crudification of the 
orthodox position and will be useful when apolied to concrete events 
later in tne paper. 
The state and capital embarked in the mid-70s on a programme of 
reform intended to ease the generalisation of monopoly capitalist 
rel.:.it.icJn·::;:. o+ to stabilise the society ool1tically. A 
sectic:Jn c)+ this paper consists of a review and an analysis of the 
approach aaooted by the state and white capital towards Black agents 
t.D E.·::; .::•.C:E'r·b.:::\te d i ·.;]. ·c::; i. Dn ::; amCJrig them and Dl~event c:l·-o·s=::.-r.: 1 ass 
unit·'/ .. 
NAFCOC is the organisatlCJn 
paper focusses. lCJok1ng a~ its recent nistory and its relationship to 
the state and caoital 1n the period of 'reform'. An imoortant theme 
of the analysis of 
organisation, and various indicators of this shift are mapped out. 
Finally the pacer engages brief discussion around the nature of the 
and against oermanent solidarity with the oppressed masses. 
Sources used can be divided into s1x groups: Personal interviews 
with members of sources close to the organisation and 
academics~ NAFCDC literature, primarily its official mouthpiece 
African Business; Political texts from South Africa and other 
countries; Secondary m0terial on the questions of the 'black middle 
total strategy and reform etc.; o+ficia.l 
public-~:..tlc!ns~ the reports of cabinet committees and 
departmental inquiries; and the press. 
In terms of the interviews, I was disappointed that I was unable to 
''on tne gr-ound'' i.-'iith tl·-a.dei·-s in the to~t-Jn·s~li!J·s, in ot··det- to 
get a feeling for their attitudes and perceptions. Interviews with 
NAFCOC leadership in Johannesburg, while not o++erinq much by wa.y of 
empirical muscle, were very helpful in terms of ·t:···,e 
cl1nica1 Insights of t~e paperwork. di::..:-::zling 
:i. nt(J t0wnship ool1~ics were offered uy academics 1n 
Jonannesburg, notaclv Mark Swilling and Tom Lodge, while Vusuf Pahad 
pr·cJ\/i cit~d :::•ol:Ltic-:!'1.1 anal·y--si s o·f his;; 
CDil:St:itt.J.ency. 
.i. n :::.; t. i t Ll r: E;· D t 
their annual surveys and their Top1cal Opinion. 
In the secondary material special mention must be maoe of the 
in+luence.· of Dan O'Meara on the politics of the state 1n the 70s and 
80s~ and Roger Southall whose work was most thorough 
question of NAFCOC and the bantustans. 
launch into the paper orooer, it 1s necessary to clarify 
the meaning of several terms. I have used the term ''aspirant A+rican 
those who by virtue of historical ethnic and cultural factors form 
the indigenous ceoples of South Africa ('black' re+ers to all groups 
who by virtue of ethnic and physiological features are excluded from 
access to state cower). 'Aspirant bourgeoisie' denotes those who have 
ownership over or access to control over the means o+ production~ but 
who due to their exclusion from state power cannot operate a= a 
boun;:Jeo:L si e in a 11 nc:w·mal 11 cap i ta.l i ·:::;t ·::;tate. 
its monopoly capital allies~ and 15 used here mainly to denote those 
groupings whom the state has seen fit to attempt to co-opt into 
suppor~ for the reg1me and reform. 
" Theo,~et i cal discussion ··-· _r;:_t~.?.2 .... -~1Jg .. r.::E?Y91.L_l!: .. i..91J 
~"-·"-""'''"''''''''''''' ············-·"-·-·· ······-··"····· -··--····~·········-······················ ·······-··-········ 
~.T.b.g .... n..~t:.l::l.C.~ .... 9.f __ c::J .. ~<:?..? ... -.~n-c:l ____ i, __ t? ..... ~P.PJ . .tr;:.~_!:j QIJ __ j:_g ___ p_g_ltttr;:~_L .. .R r::_~_r;: t :Lr;:.~. 
The discussion we are embarking on. and the ramifications thereof 
for- pol it. i c:a:L practice, hinge on our understanding of the concept of 
"social c:la.ss". 
We must be careful here to be clear as regards what level of 
abstl--action ~-Je are concerned with, and rigorously reject any 
confusion or- conflc.•.tion Df differing degrees of 
concreteness. The reification of analytical tools such as the concept 
"mode Df pi~oduct i. on" to a.ppl y it to d i st. i net sec:to1~·s in the E:?c:c.momy, 
m- the L.lse of 
materialist conceot are equally damning both frDm an academic and a 
political point Df view. 
At the lt:'.\iel of abst,~a.cti.on o·f the "mode Df p1~oduction", "c1as::;" is 
defined as a relation of an agent to the means of production. The 
value and the valDrlsation of 
c:apital \the df=.·+ini.ng chal-acteri·::;tic:s o+ the Capitalist Mode of 
are cetermined by the essence of the relationship 
- ·- ,.J -::;i.lll...i 
11 1-hE· -:.:;~JE?c:i··~·ic: E~C::C)f"i(]iT:ic: t·CJlrm J.!""l it-JhJ.c~ti LlrtPd.ic: 
labour is pumped Dut of direct producers determines the 
relationship of rulers and ruled •.. It is always the direct 
relation3hlp of the owners of the conditions of production 
to the d1rect producers ... wh1ch reveals the innermost 
r·:vi ·".·.···· ... 
! .. ; ,-:::t.! ..... i}.1. iJ 
suoerstructure which together with 
the product1ve forces comolete the ambit Df ·the cc:Jnc::f:?Dt ''mCJde o+ 
productic:Jn'' are determined at this level by the orc:Jductive forces and 
relations ot production. 
"pt~i.mary cont.l~adiction", the contradiction between 
the socialized production of surplus and the private aporopriation 
thereof~ whicn qenerates the contradiction between the oroducers of 
surplus and the owners of the means Df production~ exists at this 
level of abstraction, 
"Surp 1 us value. . . constitutes si mu.l tanF2DU5l v· the 
relation between capitalists and workers and the 
antE:•.l::JOnism be+.:.we;?n them''. <L.::~clau. J.0::/79: 104) 
simultaneously having a real e;.; i 5tence and 
determining the limits and conditions of existence (and resolution) 
of contradictions at other levels. 
Thus :·1ao: ''In thi·:~ V•?.!i·-v simple phenomenon ~1n 
thi5 "cell" o+ bouTgeoi::; society) a.nal··:~sis 1·-evea.:t.·s a.ll the 
cor,tl·-.::;.diction·s (m- thE genn o+ i:11l the contt--·::l.dictions) o·f 
modei-n society" (2) 
The limited applicability o+ th i ~=- l.e\/el anal y·si s ( tha.t D-f 
themnde of production) to cDncrete sDcial orncesses necessitates a 
level of analysis or paradigm that is able to accomodate notions ot 
----·------------w•-•-
( 1 ) 0Ltot t·:·:·ci i i'"l r .. !C)l"''t·- ::. ~:; tl ('"'l :: li Ti'"! t?. ci ;:_::· \./e l C]C"• i'i'IE~r-: t ;:)+ c E:'l.p i t~ E:'t :L 1 "::5111 in ~::3cJLt t r-, 
African Agri.cul~u.re: class 5truggle in the countryside'' in Murray,MJ~ 
ed.: ''f:":lOC\t.ii r:1+r-·L·::<:•.i""i CD.L):i.tc:\ll::;m ·=~.:-·,c:; Elc:\C::k Pc:;li.t.i.ci:.i:l (Jpr.)0"3lt.:i.Ori'' 
··r -··-i '::;:1::;; "Cln con tx· acl1 ct. i cw," (photostat) 
consciousness. nis~orically-determlned 
domination)~ cecul1ar object1ve cond1tions of a soc1al 
formation as well as subjective conditions relat1ng to o+ 
organisation, coliticisation etc. 
La.c 1 au poses 11 ant c:•.gon i ·:::;m 1' .;:~ t. two levels of analysis: that of the 
"moc:IF.? o+ p!·-oduct:i.on" (v-ihich he l~eq.3.rds .;:· •. s "c.Lc.<.·::;<:; stn_J.qgle" proper) as 
that classes only becomes 
intelliqii:>le :i.-f political and ideological relations of 
domination characterising a determinate social formation are brought 
(which he labels the "populC:H--···democr- at i c 
struggl €-?") ( 1979: 1.05) 
I would argue however that the second level of analysis must admit 
the ccmcept class and class struggle. This 1s essential 1f we are to 
i nte1'"··~sts c:J+ the classes making up the 
J. ;::?\/eJ. ~,i ].1 identifiable groups 
strU.\Jgl e, :;:,uch -3.s 1'the Ru.s:.·::;ia.n pea:~-:.:intt~'-;1 11 !' the ''A+r·ic.s.n 
•;JrOUi::lS \AJh i ch sf-tc:'u.l d nc:at be ·sef:?n or 
constituted solely at the level of relations of production~ but also 
o-f "th·~::> ensemble o·f politic.:i.l '.:md ideological n:::<l.:;..tions of 
domi n<':i.t :i. c1n". 
The failure of moder·n Western Marxist t~eories of class to clarifv 
the relations~ID je~ween the var1aus levels of abstraction as well as 
to explicate the nature determinacy of the economic and the 
relative autonomy (and mcHnentum) pol j_ tical and ideological 
instances 1~ notable. 
Thus Poulantza::; arques that the econom1c Instance 1s determ1nate in 
constituting class and class power~ but that these classes only have 
1;::.-~vel CJ+ ·::;oci .::1.1 
production: 
11 The ,~elation·::; of pn.xiuc·t. ion have a·::; their 
effect on social relations •• ·~ a distribution of agents 
of production into social classes which are at this level 
tile ',;oci <:1.1 1·-e:! . .::~.·1:1 ons cJ+ pi~oducti on. 11 
He acknowledges also that 
11 
•• the ccmsti tuti on o+ cla!·::;·::;e·::; is not n;?l a ted to 
the economic level alone, but consists of an effect of the 
en s t=~ m b l e o ·f i: h €.:> l eve l ·::, o + <:1. m_g9_t;: ___ g_f_..Q!::S:2.f:l!:::u;:-.,_t i g n. or· CJ + a 
social fonnatiCJn. 11 (my emphasis) (3) 
While the +ormal recognitiCJn of the role of the pcJl it i cal and 
ideological instances is welcome, Poulantzas does not c~arify at what 
level o·f abstractiCJn ne is dealing with and seems to be generalising 
frCJm analysis Df the CMOP. 
Moreover applications F'c:>Lt1 Ctnt:z. i c.=t.n methcJd to the 
the size and political the fHrican 
middle classes in South Africa c:CJnfine the constituent rCJle Df 
poJ.itic<.:i.J. and ideological factors to the determination of classes at 
(3) Poulc~.ntza.·,;,t)~ ''F'olltic,:;.l F'ov,;er- and ~3clcii::t.l C:lo-~·::;s::;es'', '../ei~·::;o, 19"/''5 
p.69. 
.... :... ····-· 
L! ,.::;1. ~--
oerform oroductive work, 
''the .. ';,... ·::11···· t:? ·~7:~< c .l LlCI e(J from the wor~ing class oy 
wnic~ thev perform in the virtue of the political roles 
p ,,. oduc t i. Dn Dv- cJc:•:"!·:=.;s. '' 
"ideological r·elations in the ·::;ocial divi~;ion o+ 
labour excludes engineers and technicians +rom the working 
class, and places them instead, in the new petit 
bou,~rJeo:i.s:i.e." ( :l9B6: 11) 
Crankshaw continues to say that an analysis of 
cannot, "in itself, provide a basis for predictions concerning the 
analysis of tile actual organisation of classes within such a 
struc::tun-:>". ( :L '7B6: :l6) 
It seems here that Crankshaw commits the error seemingly common to 
materialist writing on South Africa. This error is 
the application of a.n unmediated class analysis ~o the social 
formation, which while for form's sake acknowledges the imoortance of 
political and ideological factors, nevertheless proceeds to see class 
power as constituted primarily in the economic instance and then 
wielded through the political and ideological apparatuses. 
This method ignores both the complex political reality of relations 
of domination in South Africa, which cannot be reduced to the sway of 
monopoly ca8ital, as the contradictory and oolitically 
(L~) Cl~ank·5fla.I;~.J, C)~ ''ThE~Cii'"i.f.~S o·F Clo:\~_;:=.; .:"\r-,d t.he Af!""iC.:"::l.n ''i"!idc:le c:i.a·::;::;'' 
t !l ~:3cJu. t h i:·::i f r- i c:: ·=~··· " .t C) l:, '7 ····· l C:) f:5 :·~; ' 1 " r; f 1·- i c: a. F'ei··- -~; iJ E~c:: ·;: i \/ e 1 ·~>f36 p ~;. 




mode of o~oduction. 
These determinants c a.n c-Jn l ':r' be fully app~ec1ated 1n an analyt1cal 
fr-ame~rJot~k t.i·,;,:· •. t t(J ta:·::t:~ .'::\ccou.nt of the m,::..tt~i;~ o+ :-ii·:;tor:ical 
economic .,::;.nd political factors that: 
con_iunctu;~f2~ ,:::..n c:a.n t h ~:.~(J;·- i se tile s;oci al 
contradictions arising OUi.: C)-f th i ·::; }.f1 
prog~essive political 
that society in the interests of t~e p~oducing classes. 
I 
r: 
The Sixth World Congress of the Commun1st International which met 
in Augu.st. ~::;C) U. t: h f:1+rics. 1n :Lt.s 
deliberations on the revolu~1onary movement in the colonies and semi-
colonie<::.;, Execut:~.ve Committee aoopted a lengthy resolution 
formul<.:i.tior• o·f the "Na.t i vr,.2 i=t:epub 1 i c::" the·;::;i·:s, 
atta.i nmen :.: D-f an "i ndewenc:iE~nt native :=;outh Af ,~ i can t-epub l i c as a 
stage towards a workers' full, equ.al 
rights fCJI~ ;:;.11 ,.-;:;.ce·s". (5) 
The basis for this slCJgan lay in the characterisatiCJn CJf 
Domin j_ Dll C)f 
Native population {except in the Cape province) CJt the cCJuntry have 
no polit:i.r~>:ti. the power of the State has been mDnopDlised 
more blended with the interests CJf British financial and industrial 
c:ap:i. ta.l". 
The stn ... u~q 1 t:.• for a Native Republic was according to the ECCI a 
str-uqglE~ i::..qainst 
and the white and black reformist 
~~~E'i'--p·l: ~:; + r·~;~~-;- ;;:.~7 ec uti '-/F Cc:.~nmi. t ti:?e o·f the Communi S51:. I nto::?rnat i Oli·::'i:L : 
"The ~5C)Lt t h P1·i: ;---· :l \: ~·::-t n C!u t~, :::; t: :i. tJr·~ il i. n ~3cJLl t j···~ t:·.\+ 1 .. - i c -:":i.n c::cj1T11T:u.n i :::. t -:..:, f:)p t~a. k; 
London 1 '7f:3(i 
for the Africanisation of the s~ruqgle meant for the ECCI the auoport 
by the CPSA for the national liberation of the African maJority: 
"South Af J·-· i c-:~ i ~5 a b 1 E•C: k cou.ntrv·. r.:.hp ma.J cH~ i. t y 
of its population is blac:K and so is the major1ty of the 
workers and peasants. The bulk of the South African 
population is the black peasantry, whose land has been 
expropriated by the white minority. Seven eighths of the 
land is owned by whites. Hence the national question in 
South Africa, which is based upon the agrarian question 
lies at the foundation of the revolution in South 
Afr-ica. H (6) 
Hence suppDr··t wa.s Ul'··ged f o1~ thE· '' emi::JJ·-von i c na.t i onal oJ·-qan i sc:,t. ions 
among the natives, such 
tCJ ti- anf.~f o1···m .: .t.. .L L into ·='- Hfiqhting na.t i. ort.:3.l i ·::;t r-evol ut 1 Dnary 
organisation against the v·J7i:i. te bourgeoisie and the Dr-i tish 
i m~H?r i ali st s H. 
The the·ais o·t~ 'Tolonia:Li::;m o+ a f::lpec::ia.l Type" was first fully 
''The Pciad 
the South African Communist Party which was adopted at the fifth 
national conference of the Party in 1962. The thesis provided the 
descriptive and analytical framework for the Party programme of 
·-··-··-· ..... ! t·.:.'L. ·•- ·:::' .. i. the oas1c continu1ty of 
and economic power. and 
The conquest by Outen and British imperia~1sts of the indiqenous 
peoples and the entraining of the indigenous maJority as labour was a 
formation oefore the discovery of qold and 
However the latter development saw the 
rapid and general introduction and imposition of monopoly capitalist 
p;·-·oducti on an•j the proletarianisation of the masses of 
Afric<::~IT-:3. 
This proce·s~; on the maintenance a.n•j 
intensification of colonial forms of domination, including indirect 
rule. The intervention ot the colonial state was necessary to destroy 
the i ndt:?penderYt. indigenous economies and procure labour. At no stage 
was it necessary to enlist the political suoport of the indiqenous 
population to ensure the entrenchment of caoitalist relations Cas it 
1n the metropolitan social formations), indeed the survival 
of the mines and continued capitalist accumulation depended centrally 
on the super-exploitation of the African worKers and the subsidy of 
the wage by the reserve economies. 
Consolidation of 
Political and armed struggle over precisely which white grouping 
Would be dom1nant in the developing capitalist social formation. The 
Union of 1010 saw tne raporochement of the wnite ~ulino classes under 
' t:.. 
II all C:f [.~IT)()::.:;.-.;·). t. i C r1g~ts ana ~o11t1cal dom1nation ov a group which 
~o Sou~n African Freedom argues tha~ ''there are no acute 
the fi p r·- c:;-f e·s s j. cJn ,::?.1 qr-·Du.o'::;" not as a rule earning salar1es or living 
differ·-entlv +rom their·- +ellnw A+r·-·ic:ans. Incl<?.ed. tht:! "i ntel 1 ectu.::;.l·s 
and the professional groups among tne Africans snare with their 
people a::.::. the nardsh1ps and indignities of colonialism'', and many 
from amongst them have 
advancemen·i:.: in cwder~ to .JC:d.n whollv with t.~·,eir peoo:i.e". 
The restrict1ons and limitations on tne African commercial class 
mean that their interests ''lie I.A!hclJ.y i.n jcininq the •r;CJrker-·:::; and 
rural pe:•op 1 e for·- the o\;er~tnr-o•,..J D-f l.<J•-, i te supremacy 11 • 
national liberation, 
this 
..._ ..... _ 
Ll !t::' continuous 
ot a united front of 
the unity of Communists and non-Communists, the 
unity of freedom-loving oeoole of all nationalities and all anti-
The oas1s for these tasks lies in the identification of the 
"func!ament.::d c:ontr-·adictions. of ~3outJ1 i4frr·J.c<::i.r1 
society: between the oppressed people and their rulers, 
between South African colonialism and the world-wide 
movement against colonialism and imperialism; between the 
working class anc the rural masses, togetner with the 
m1ddle classes, on tne one side. and the handful of 
ITt CJ ll (j ~j O:J l \/ C ~·:l i:] j. t: ~;:i. J .i -~;;. t·. ·::~! (j r·i ·c_ h ,;:.~ •::1 t. i"""i 2 I .. '; ( ~:::~ ) 
------··-----··-·----···---·-------
(8) Itli ci. 
The ma1n conten~ of Democratic Revolut1on' 
na.t ion a .. i. 
establishment of a nat1onal democrat1c s~ate. 
Further tneoretical the Colon1alism of a Special 
Type thesis is necessary. 
bourgeo1s par~iamentary democracy on tne one hand and a 
highly coercive state apparatus, directed primarily at the Black 
masses, em th•:::) othe:~." (9) 
This two-faced form of state wields power in favour of the white 
colonial ,~u.:.inq bloc. The l,:::;.ttel'- i:; ,:::;. "nation-:":\.1" allia.nce o-f classes 
made up primarily of the White bourgeoisie and White sections of the 
petty-bourqeoisie and the proletariat 
contradic~ions do exist~ they are generally limited in favour of 
maintaininq colonial domination. 
Class and class-fractional divisions also exist 
bloc con·::;;i st i n•:;J o·f ,::11 1 opp:·-·:::)·::;sed gi~Du.p i ng·:;. The maj o1~ canst i tuents of 
the col on i s,ed bloc black the semi·-·· 
proletarianised peasantry and the black mino;·-it'/ of the petty-· 
bourgeoisie. All Df these are oopressed <though to varying decrees of 
intensity) and all share a common interest in the national liberation 
of the African majority. 
The question of the validity of the aoolication of the national 
question to the South African sCJcial formation has occupied many 
-:----·------·-·-·· .. ----·---........................ -.... .. 
(9) Anon: ''Colonic.•.J.i·:;:.,m D+ a. t:l;Jecic-:o.l i<ind <::\l-td the SCluth (:,+,~i<::,:::in ~3ta.te: 
A con~;ide;·-ai.::i.on of 1'-ec::E~nt a;~ticle:::."~ {'tfl~ica ;:::·e,~sDective lci'80. 
,~ 
t 
reams of a.c::.::\Cle!n:i. c ~"'Jr 1 t :i. n (] II ,, n ~~~=t t. J. c)n 'l CJ f 
The pol it i ci::;.l constitution of tne nation arises from a combination 
of social and "ethni.c" factors. The social fac~ors include economic 
ties and t.mi tv of c .l ass•::>S a.nd class fractions that 
''Ethnic'' +act:.c:JI'-5 inc l1...1.de the 
bel i e··F s ~ .:;:~.nd p·::;·:~c:hol ogy sha.ped by the 
geographical environment, ccHnmon origin and centuries of historical 
devel c:Jpment •. " Ti·ie soc :i. al a.i .... e "dial.ectica.lly connected", 
"unbreakably united", ethnic. although it is the "·soci .:;:~.1 
The nation has been defined as 
.~§ __ 1 as tj_r:!..fl_!_!..i.~::; to_,.- i c -~L..£_0 '11m L!:.D i tV_::;!.±__ o eo o :t t-? 
!;fl_IJ..2..t.l-__ t '-i.t.:lJJ_Q_.£_:f.q.r_rn __ g_f __ ~?.~!Ei:=' L d e v:.~ 1 9..R.!.Tit-£!lL b ;;:~~ e d _9..!::!..--.t..b. e 
t;: __ g_l_ll~D.l::-.ti::-!.Lt.Y.._Jd~f... __ §t= c:J.!::-!.9.!I~J .. c .LL:f~ __ il::' .. --~;.!:.~l.!.hiD.§.. t i ·~v• it h the. 
s . .9.!!"!.0.~ir_1_.t_:\;_)-'. __ q_:(_ __ J_~~D . .9.~,.',.?.9..~..!!..._._:~~.§X:r::.i ... tfl r y_!'----~-~LLt.!-1'~ ~.-!L-c on s ~J . ..9 usn e ~..2. 
s-_o_r;j ___ _fl_~?_Lf..h..c.1I.9 o \/ .!._: ( ;::~ e d o s e \-/ e v e t a 1 :L 9 7 7 : 2 7 ) 
While many of these features are as yet latent or suppressed in the 
Mrican nation-in-becoming, a grea~ sour to the national unity of the 
African people CDmmon -:3.nd 
suppression of their culture. 
and otiler blacks constitutes them as 
one o ·F the ~JD1 f::.·s o+ the and 
Opp,~es·sec:l~ _L1r2fin:~nq the ''c::ominan+..: contr··ac!icticln'' cJf the ~3outh f~+r··ican 
soci.:::\J. fo;·-m;::..i:ic:Jn,. a c: on t.1·-· ,;:._ d 1 c t i. CJ n j_nteliiqi.bility 
---·-·····--------.. -·······--·-····--·-·-····-···-·········-· 
(10) Fedo~::;E~·-;~~2v,!:::· 1'-~ et. al.: "LJ2nin1sm .and the Na.tie;na.l Qu.,::>c.;tion", 
Progress. Moscow 1977. . 
'
'' .. "' ·,· ..... ~ ... 
' 
depends on tne ensemole ot oolitic~i 
.1 Ll. :s '[ the re.ations of (Lac:lau 
1979: JUUI 
The dominan~ con~radic:tion designate:::; the dominant 1 i nt~ ···f.J\:J 
. 'I ;ocl a~ in a particular social If we agree that the 
for-m of state in South Africa is predicated on the monopoly of 
by the white bloc and ~he exclusion of blacks from 
all but token representation~ we can conclude that the ",jomi nant 
contr·adir.:-i::.}.c:m of it cannot be resolved 
within the present state). 
It has been argued that the soecific structure of the South African 
economy and the conditions of reproduction of monopoly capitalist 
relations are similarly dependent on white minority rule ana the 
Sllbcwdi na.ti. on o·f b1ac~< c3.gent·:s 1n the economy. The implications of 
this are that the resolution of the dominant contradiction (whi1e not 
ushering in socialism) must overthrow the dominance of monopoly 
capital and fundamentally alter the balance of forces in favour ot 
the working class. 
The articulation of the two essential contradictions of ~3ou t h 
African society - the primary/determinant and the dominant occur in a 
" 1n capitalist soc1ety the two forces in 
contradiction, the bourgeoisie and the oroletariat, ~orm 
the ori~c1oal contradiction. The other contradictions, 
such as those between the remnant feudal class and the 
bourgeoisie, between the peasant pe~ty bourgeois1e and the 
bourgeoisie. between the non-monoooly capitalis~s and the 
caoitalists, ~etween oourgeois democracy an~ oourgeois 
tasctsm. among the caolt3lls~ countr!es and oetween 
imcer1ai1sm and the colon1es, are a!i de~ermined or 
:L n f: 1 I.J .:.-? r·, c:: i!.·:·:· :.:·1 b \/ t J···, :i. ~:; ;J r .... 1. r .. i c i 'J .::~.1 c C:J n t r· ·=·=·:~ d 1 c:: t i c:; n i: ( J. .i. ) 
While ~h1s may orov1oe us witM the basis for unders~anding social 
it remains a frame~orK of analys;i'::.; o+ 
ob_iect:L\/P ccmd:i.tion::;, <:;.nd cannot. identify the forces of change and 
reaction that arP grouped around those objective contradictions. The 
Who are thP oeople? It is clear that we cannot simply collapse the 
notion o+ 
because objectively their interests are in contradiction to monopoly 
capital~ the sta.te and its a.ll i e·5. At the same time it would be 
dangerous to claim that the qualification for inclusion is based on 
class pcisit.ioll~ J. H f? .. th.3.t. it. is the working class and the semi-
masses who are the ureal" people, wnile others 
are merely tactical and temporary allies. Not only would this dPny 
the revolutionary potential and contribution of non-working-class 
classes and strata~ but it would gloss over the attempts of the state 
lin some cases successful) to recruit allies from amongst the more 
Ski l ".t >"_._, r __ j ;:.\. r··1,_-lj t ... ·~·~, ~.·.'-'- 1m r ... ) ,,- . -... ~.-. l:J. __ .,_ . -... -. ,'·.·.· "-'.·· • ·".' r· ,· .. -i , · r 1~- 1 • ~ q ·; · - · .. ~ - ~~ ~Ln_-c~ass sectors. 
I' I P._ l. i-_1-1 <.··.-.·.· 1'- L·- c.·:,_l-l t ·- - . ..., - .. -·~ . . -1- "l ., ~ -·' 1'=-' , .• •:.:op J. i::: · ·::; ca.mp con;;J. s ._ so. ei. y o-f tho·:;e sectoF"s 
mobilised 1n progressive organisation. leaving out those sec~ors ye~ 
untouched or bound uo in ethn1c and con~ervative structures. 
--------------·-···--··--·-·-·---------
(11) j·.,·ta.c•: 11 CJn C:cJrlt.;'"·a.dict.J.cJn: 1 p.2~3'~ 
pMticular ~~aqe contribu~e to ~he Prosecution ot tne immediate goals 
of nation ,::i.l oemocrat1c strugg~e. Th1s means that there are many who 
111ay qu.:::-d i + y a~ one conJuncture. yet fall plainly outside at another. 
t.h€·? i:JE~ople'"·::; cam~:i .:'":\.n;_i 
the oppre::;sed allows for the inclus1on of organisations 
~d activists wno by into the oppressor 
bloc. 
11 
.... the concer.it f.J··::: a. people a.s:; a. siJe,=i·fic ·:;cJcia:L 
community is historically precise and may have a different 
social essence in different conditions, countries and even 
at various stages of development of one and the same 
COUITt.l~y • 
••• a people 1::; a community of the working 
classes, but it can also include other sections of the 
population,whicn ••.. participate in promoting historical 
i:n-c;•;p'-e·::;~:; in t:·-~~=' gi·-1en time .::tnd the gi.,,;en cil~cumstances". 
( 12) 
The imp er-a. t i 'v'•"':?' for uni~y amongst the oppressed has in recent times 
been consistently critiqued as a threat to working-class hegemony and 
a veileo attempt to obfuscate class differences among the oPpressed. 
The OW?!sti on cross-class unity .L;::,. not u.ntqLle tc:. tt-te= South A+,~ i can 
question~ nell·- ident1fication of con t r- ~::..d i c t :i. c;n. 
Al thOL!q h f ea;~ f u l of overstressing how the 
question has been addressed elsewhere 1s necessary. 
obviously, unity is stressed in terms ot winning the 
of class and class-~ractional allies at the same time 
t h F::~ :"5C)C: :l E:t. :J. base o+ the c~ass enemy and str1~ping 1t of 
supportive classes. 
-( --·----·--·--··--··---··--·--·-·-----
12) Chirkin, V Y.and YUdln, ·· .. ,...- ?~: •! Pt ~3r..>c 1 E~ l i -~:; t ·····iJ1 .... i e-::n t ecJ ~)t. a. t. e; 




11 E;c:> wh .. 3.t. w::~.s t.r··,,::.;; c;_J.t~·::::.·r~.lC:lr··: o·t I_J_r-,l·r.\/ 1n LJi.J.J··- l.a.r·;c]··;t 
Funoamenta~i~ i~ was s1moly tn1s: 1n ~ne first olace. as 
e~eryone Knows~ union maKes for strenq~h.~ Rignt from tne 
momen~ w~en there came intc the heads of some sons of our 
soil the idea of e11m1nating foreign colon1alist 
dom1nation. there arose a question of strength, the 
strength necessarv to oe pitteo aga1nst the streng~h of 
ti-·te c~o>:m:i.a:Li".:;ts ••. " (1::;;) 
Many have carrec~ly o·F co].l ap·si nq the 
alliance o+ strata that make up the popular bloc into a 
single undifferent1ated rn.::1.·::;·s. It 1s crucial that the common factors 
that unite the popular classes are not mistaken for a simple identity 
Lenin ( 14) that the contradiction between the:· two 
classes involved democratic revolution (the oroletariat and 
the peasantry) was real and would arise in s~ruggle between them once 
the contradiction between themselves and Tsarism had been resolved: 
''Beyond the iJou.nds of df.?.mocJ~at:i.~:;m theJ~;;? c<::1.n bE.~ 
no question cf the proletariat and the peasant bou.rqeoisie 
having a single will. Cl~ss struqqle oe~ween ~nem is 
inevitable, but it is in a democrat1c republic that this 
struggle will be the most thoroughgoing and widespread 
-~:; t 1,... u. ~] ~;-~ 1 e CJ ·f 1: n ~~ p e (J p 1 i:2 + CJ r:.. ·::; g_~j. -==':.l.i.M2.!!l.. '1 
The :l rn,llecj 1 at•?.! oi::l_iecti\iF2 +m- the on:JJ. etc<ri a.t was the winning of a 
democratic republic, in the strugqle far which the greatest number of 
allies was needed, an a common programme of democracy: 
''Tt-1e at:>sencf:~ o·i: ur·tity on qu\:::.·sc:ioi-t::; o·f ·:;oc::ia.ll<::;tTt 
a.nd 1n tne :;truggle for soc1alism does not preclude 
singleness of w1ll on quest1ons of democracy a.nd in the 
<14) LE"!nin. 'v'I: ''TwD -i··act.ics of boc:i.:~.J. Democ:t·.:~cy 111 T:.f-1e DetTtDC:l~a.tic 
Revolution" in '.3•:?lec:ted Wol~~,:·:::; vol2 p104 
I 
I 
·::; t , ..-i...l. (.:;,i q .l t·:~ ·t: C::• i.-. -:::t. i .... ~7: ;::J !.J D .i. l .::~ " .. f. Cj ·}· CJ i.·~ (] F2 -~.·. • ... ! ! .L ·:::~ v~J C) 1.) . . \. C1 D (-;:-: 
t. .:::..n ·i: ·7.\ITi(jiJ!-! t t (J ·f: Ctt·-· q F:!.•t ·r:. 1 n (} t 1-'; e :i. Ctq 1 C ~:tl ·:·~~.i ... l cJ hi ·:~> t. (Ji.- i Ci:·~.l 
diffe~ence oetween a temoc~at1c ~evo1ut1on and a soc1alist 
r- .-::~\iCJ :;. 1 . ..1. t :'.on. To + o1·- q f:-:t ·this~ 'I-I·::JU l•j be 1: c-=..r-, -c .,:~.mount to 
fo~getting the charac-ce~ of tne democ~atic revolut1on as 
c, n i:? ~d.i:_.t.t!~.--!t.J.tl~~.1 ... ~ ..... .S~f::9.I:.?._t.~~. • u " 
In the Vietnamese oeoole's struggle the importance of bu1lding and 
strengthening -cne united front against imoerialist aggression did not 
prevent the differentiation of the class interests of the constituent 
cl a sse·:::.. In fact the strengthening of unity was seen to be dependent 
oo precisely the identification of the commonality and divergence of 
class inte~ests at different stages: 
11 Cln e can n oi: ~=c.1n c e i \/e c1·f a. c: ~. €:\ ·:s·::;l ess ·t= 1.- cJn t ... a t:Jn i?. 
should view and solve all problems related to the Front 
policy from a class standpoint. The~e are classes with 
essentiallv similar interests and classes whose interests 
converge only to a ce~tain extent. Each class, for the 
sake of its own and the common inte~ests, joins forces 
with othe~ classes within the F~ont. Moreover, the common 
interest itself is viewed by each class from its own 
angle. On account of the historical position of the 
proletariat, its class interest and the common national 
inte~est are the same. But for the other classes. their 
~esoective interests and the common national interest 
conve~qe in some resoects and diverqe in others. For tnis 
reason, the~e must necessarily be a struggle cetween the 
viewpoints of the va~ious membe~s of the Front wno 
represent different classes, even tnough the Front must 
strive to maintain and strengthen unity. One-sided unity 
unaccompanied by st~uggle leads 1n practice to the 
d i sr .. up t :i. or-, o·f un 1 t 'y· 0.:1n d the co :i. l c-~.p ',:;i.=-? o·i· t ht"2 Fi'-on t. '' ( 1. ~.5) 
~as wa~ned. the flip-side of class-blind populism the 
inab i 1 .i. t ··.,; cq-· strategise arounc class differences in the 
exoloitation of tne cont~adictions -chat exist 
in ~he enemy camp 1s c~uc1a1 in order -co 
( 1 6 .) [.·. ". -· (·.-J r·l l ~. I .·· ·-'.! ·.·.', _, '', l:·rhe? l]u.t:~·:st.ic:)fl of ljnit.'y ..... {:, F:t::~~:;~L· ... /! 1 f:3fiL.E~ v·c]J. li ncJ3 Jan 
1986 p:s:: 
······· .... .;::1.! il.J Tne mos~ dangerous 
1'.The ITIOI .... r:.e wc~w;"-?.i··-+Lll enein·y CE:i.n bE'.:! \/.a.n(::jU.~t. s:.r·,.-2ci cJn:L ·y· 
bY exerting the utmost effort, and by the most tnorough~ 
C -:?:'1. r- 1-:-~ + L~ 1 :t -:·:·:\ C. ·t:. ,:;_, !'! -t:. :i. \/ t:?. !f ·:~ k i 1 f 1...1. 1 E~. i'i d gj;!.J. ... i. C~ §..:h C) i':.L U. ·:;:.; e C:) ·f -:3. il '/ , 
even the smallest~ rift between the enemies, any conflict 
among the bourqeo1sie of the various countries and among 
the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the 
various countries~ and also by taking advantage of any~ 
even the smallest, opoortunity of winn1ng a mass ally, 
even tnougn this ally is temporary. vacillating. unstable, 
unr·t?.l i ,;;;[J l e <'3.ncj conc:i it :i. Df"lE1.:L. 11 ( 17) 
We have cDvered much grDund in this discussion, much Df it by way 
to ·the "I"' illS rj i scu.s·::;i on of 
and the ramifications of revolutionary theory for South 
Africa will when we delve deeper into the question of the 
position of the African middle classes in the current conjuncture. 
- ----.. -·--·-.. ---.... -·-·--···-······ .. ·-· 
( 17) L.f2n :i. n. '.) .i: ~ '' '' L.E·?·f t:. ····· ~\1 :i. r··~ Cl' C::c:Jmmc.ln i c,;,m ···· f::ln .J: P f .:::~.n t i 1. e D i ·::;.:::ll'" c Pi·- ' 1 ~ 
Progress, ~oscow 1981 p55 
f 
~· T h §..J:1t.Li..!.§X:.Y ... _.:: ___ .l'1.9..1J .. 9.P..9..1Y.. .... E:l11 .. i. ... ?..IJ.<; .. §?. ...•.. :t: .. §.h .. §.?. ...... ?.b .. §P. .. §?.. 
economic exoans1on the 60'' s saw the 
generalisation ot monopoly cao1talist relations of proouction, often 
and the 
central1sation of the economy as a whole under several 
monopol i e·s. 
This period also saw an unprecedented 
that took the form of penetration by multinationals, particularly of 
US origin. 
This development occurred s1multaneous~y with the assertion ot US 
hegemony globally, e~-:: pa.n·:si on cJ+ us interests being 
particularly notable in the penetration of the European economies and 
the recently decolonised states of tne periphery, particularly in 
Africa, Indochina and Latin America. South Africa was no exceotion to 
this pher'!oin,~nc.,n :1 1n tne years since World War II, a.nd e·::;pecially 
since l '7'60. intJ.1 t. in ~Jt. i rJna.:L hc;.v·e ii!Ltltie>lir:?d thei ,~ 
di 1·-•:?Ct by United States 
corporations having more than doubled since 1969. 
Ho: .. '-!eVE"2i'" the 6C1 =· ·~s, pr··-t:~di c-:::..tt~d on the national 
super-exoiolta~ion of the Afr1can masses ithe wore 
ln 1~5 scientif1c sense to connote the range of popular 
Classes and non-class grouoings oppressed by a carticuiar social 
did not resolve but intensified both tne essential and non-
essential contrac1cttons of tne svstem. Along w1tn the heightened 
impa.ct of CJ+ 
particularly tne dem1se of colonial rule and the growing power of the 
non-aligned movement. 
Several factors of the organ1c crisis that gathered momentum in the 
early and u·s dir-ec·cly. Two main categor1es present 
themselves: those factors 1 symptoms that concern directly the 
abi 1 i ty of the state to perform its functions (broadly defined as: 
the resolution of contradictions among the ru11ng classes and class 
strata and the reproduction of conditions for continued capitalist 
accumulation, including functions of repression and socialisation of 
the dominated classes); and those factors ! symptoms that had a 
bearing on the immediate imperatives o·f capitalist accumulation 
(problems of productivity and valorisation). 
The regime as structured under Vorster was clearly unable to 
respond creatively to the mass resistance gathering momentum within 
the country and the growing :t ·::.;o l a. t i. or' of South Afr1ca in the 
subcontinent. The security analysis offered by the dominant security 
force (the Bureau for State Security [80SSJ which was Vorster's cower 
basel saw the political crisis primarily in terms of conspiracies by 
agitators. BOSS was caugh~ off-gUard by the events of June 1976 and 
reacted without any clear strategy. The military under PW Botha and 
Malan were oarticularly angered bv the failure of the incursion into 
Angola in the 5Ummer of 1775-76. which had occurred at tne 1nsistence 
Of BOSS. 
;···:ci .i. :i. ·:::; t. i i~:: 
i2 cue~~ion of nat1ona~ secur1~v an~ tne centralisat1on 
of t h i. r, k :i. r·, q 
ctevel opm.::?ITi::. in :::;cJtTil? t.l iHE:; unrJer-
·j- ] ..... 'I., .. , , ... i . I .... ,· par .... t..c .. Lc,, .. ·-. ....,.,. doc ·i.~., ... in 0.0 =.;, 
sec:w- it·..; .. neec.i 
defensib~e oolicy ensu.:re a G c>me·s t. i c 
stab i 1 i ty. 
At this; stage ~he NP was dominated by the more right-wing elements 
of the 
workers and sections of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, particularly 
th 
.. . . . . 
e pO.i.ltl.CC:i.i. 
The response of these elements to 
a. r.Jemanc; in E"~·:ssenc:e + Oi .. -
intensification of nat1onal oppression •:?;.; o]. c:-Ji tat ion of black 
agent. ·o:; ~ lft.iqnt contr-ol ineasu.J·-eS:~>, 
restTictj.CJns on the employment of skilled African labour, no form of 
recoqni t.i ;:::;r-, crf African trace unions and continued state control of 
The per-cept i. c:.~1 that these policies intensify the multi-
faceted crisJ.s of the state consolidated the association of reformist 
element·:::; (E•.cJ. i, ... , tne Cape NP which l a1~;::.1e····sc.::tl e 
capital intensive ~armers and c.::~.pi t<:tl) the 
security concerns of the mil1tarv and allied forces. 
-·· .. . . 







f~cec o~ deeo-seated struc~urai ob5~ac1es co con~inueo 
cnange ~o cao1~al intens1ve orocesses as part of 
dependence on cheap unsKilled migrant labour towards demand for large 
of thE~ 60 '' ·::; a.rHJ tr·,e c:ont i nued influx of fore1gn investment capital 
cushioned the effects of o+ the lack of a skilled 
workforce: however c: j'" i :::; i :::; ' it~::; in the 
recessionary conditions of the early 1970's. 
capital's was the sinal 1 size o·f the 
de~ermined largely by the i mpo·,.-er i shment cJ+ the 
Bl ac: k m,:;_,~ k et (the v-Jhite con·::;umel~ mal~ ket largely saturated 
the obstacles placed in the way of the full exploitation 
of the Bls.ck the logic of "separate 
devel opml:~r·,t". 
It. was the maintenance at a rigid racial division of 
labour-· and including 
Bantu [-::cli . .J.ca-t ion and township condit1ons, were posing a threat to the 
interests of capital. 
growing mil1tancy .1: q, t.he 
strata. Strike waves and 
tTt(Jr·~~ C 1 E? :'::l.f' 1 'y' 
i,·.JOir· kin ';i C 1 a.·~:;·;;, 
than in 
and its allied classes and 
became a theme of t.he early 
and mid the gro~ing unity and solidar1ty of stucents ana 
the oporessed under the 
dominatec c!a~~es 1n the1r ~ooress1on could not be relied on. 
The coalescence ot the var1ous aspects of the cr1sis imPacted on 
the state to ~rompt the strengtnening of the alliance between the 
military and Afrikaner capital and the intervention of both of these 
sectors into oolitical struggles over state policy (O'Meara 1980:12). 
The -fcll'-mu:La.tiDn of the c::onc;~pt CJ.f ''TCltal ~3ti·-at.E?c:J'-/'' <whic:-1 we will 
return to below) and its e::-;pli.cD.ti.on 1977 White Paper on 
hosted b·v' the Institute fCJr Strateqic Studies in Pretoria and 
attended by representatives of the US military, the SADF and 
as well as a meeting 
convened by the National Management and Develooment FCJundation 
attended iT/ military officers and 
All Oi" these developments orovided an opportunity for the alliance 
to establish anc refine a base-line programme, and for the wider 
implic<:.<.t:i.C.iii·s of their technocratic proposals to be ~horoughly 
canvassed. Crucial to these deliberations was a s~ressing of the 
global context of the cr1s1s in SCJuth Africa, and an emphasis on the 
art i c u :L <:~ t i on o Y: South African national security with the interests. 
both economic and geo-political 
states. The fact that 
(-19) -s-:._e-1 ·;:-J-1 -~·~~-·-·-··-:-•. ,~-··-~,··:~···-, .... ,. 
-== _._ __ .,.,:t .I 1, 7' ed.~ill··-~~-:·:·•.tion.:::..l ~3~-=cu.r-l"i::'::i= 
• ...... :::; 1m~erialism re1nforced the 
per-c E~ 1 \IPC:i i .. i ~~-:·!~2t.J ; __ .... -'-· i ... : .. JI...}I,,,; I ·r· .-.. ~ne counter-revolutionary 
capability of the regime and to enhance 1~s stability. 
The victory of the technocrat1c-reformist alliance came about after 
scandal. the circumstances of wh1ch need not concern 
What is crucial for our concerns is that this victory was 
on the power of the faction within the National Party 
i tsel + ~ ncn·- upoer echelons of the state Departments. The 
accession of the reformists was only assured through the intervention 
of the military into political struggles, the unprecedented united 
th~~ c:~:..pi tc:\l i ·::;t_ clas·~se·:;, it·:5 organisations and especially 
its pn:~s;s against the right-wing as exemplified by Connie Mulder and 
in +a\tOUI·- In a very real sense, then, PW Botha owed his 
position to forces outside 
contrary to the 
economic <'3.nd political interests of broad 
Party support base. 
The jettisoning of traditional NP supporters (Transvaal farmers and 
ci vi J. ::of21·-·· . --a;--,t ·s, the white petty-bourgeoisie, the white 
Proletariat) added urgency to the imoerative of consolidating supoort 
from c<::~p i ta.l anci bi·-o,.:':i.den i ng the 1' 1r·e+ or-m co,?:ll it ion 11 to inc: 1 ude S€~cto1~s 
Of the A·f r- i ca.n, ::: nd i E•.n -:3.nci C:c)l Ciu.r·ecj middle classes and commercial 
1n1s was bv no means an unc:ontradic~ory orocess. 
Many of Monoooly caoital's 
(20')--~-;.;~;--;.~-~~~t i nutDn .-~.3 
Mlll i- 1. ·--r=-t r'' ... , ·t· ~- ::·, n1:.. 1. ;::.t · ·" -· - ', - ~-- --Y 
demands reoresented progress relative to 
and Stability in a mDdernising. 
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contrary to the 
economic c:~.nd political interests of broad 
Party supcort base. 
The jettisoning of traditional NP supporters (Transvaal farmers and 
ci vi J. =:oe1··· · . --c..;·; t s, the white petty-bourgeoisie, the white 
Proletariat) added urgency to the imoerative of consolidating supoort 
from C:<':lp i tc..l anci bi·-o .. :":l.den i ng the 1' ,--·ef or·m co.-.3.1 it ion 11 t.D inc 1 ude s€~cto,~s 
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Many of Monoooly cao1tal's demands reoresented progress relative to 
and Stability in a modernising. 
volB no2 Decemoer 1981; p 6 
the pi'"F2··.;.::\1 i. 1 ;-·1n di .::J 1 n 
fE.•tc: II ) the consolidatLon and 3treamllning of 
manopo.l·r· ..: -~~- D 1 ·f:. -3.1 on 
a tiine of ceeo recession. This was even more the case 
I?.l ac k J- -·· l.. t.J white 
monopoly retailers and other concerns. 
tne 1nteres~s of monooo1v 
capital; 
the defusino of oote~~1al resistance through 
reforms that would: 
* establish a sta~le, semi-skilled uroan workforce separate 
from the concerns and struggles of the unemoloyed and rural poor in 
the bant.u.·::;t<::tn<:.> ~ 
* neutralise the militancy of the independent trade unions in 
bureaucratic union structures, 
* encoLn·-ar~e ac::cu.mul<.:l.tic:m by a "Bl.::t.c:k mici•jle class" which tt·Jou:Lcl 
(at l ea:st) be less likely to unite in struggle with the masses, 
preferably steer the liberation movement onto a reformist course or 
at best come out in open support of the regime and gradual reform. 
The re-organisation of tne state under PW Botha and 
the centralisation pOIA.Iel~ away from elected 
representatives towards appointees of the dominant forces in the new 
order. <22) The power of the Cabinet was substantially reduced~ being 
repla.ced by· Committees Constitutional 
Affairs, Economic: Affairs and Social Affairs>. Each is chaired by the 
State President or his nominee and are empowered to make decisions 
over and CJ.bove the committee consists of 
representatives of thE' mil i ta.ry ~ a.r1 d 11 e ;{ p i::?r t -;:, '1 ·f ;--·om 
the business or academic fields. Botha has in this way been able to 
---------·" ... ·-··-----~---·····------············-······--·· 
( 22) see Ci,::=! l d t2r·, h Ll'l~::- !i D ~3. r·! c~ ~< c)·t. -:::: E·" \···t ~ i! r:·, :::~ r.' f.-? c: t ::~ <J + F' c'1 i t:. i c -:·~·,_ i [iec :i. -::; i c,r·i ----
11\akin;~ in ~3ou.t.h i4fr·-lcc.~"~ F'oli.t:lkon \/OJ. :.0 no : Ju.ne 198::::; 
the dominance of the miiltarv-monooolv alliance. 
th\?. ifiO<:";t ~~ta.t.t-=? St:~cLti,..l ty· 
President and acts in 
facet .:J+ a.ct1 \/1 t·-,..-. comot~:L se·::; Cabinet 
Ministers~ seconded top officials in the secur1ty forces, including 
of Ir.-c.ell :Lgence, t.lte De-f t=.~nce F'cJi.-ce, the 
Commissioner of Police and Ministerial Secretaries. 
head•::=d by General AJ Van 
Deventer, implements the decisions of the SSC and represents the most 
oowerful bureaucratic structure in the State apparatus. It is fed by 
oath National and Military Intelligence Services and con~rols fifteen 
Interdepartmental Committee~ <IDCs), which cover all aspects of state 
act i v i t y· a. n d the exoertise of both government officials and 
orivate corporat1ons. the 
Management System that is oerhaos more important to u::; is the series 
~Joint Management Centres <JMCs), nine of which serve the different 
geographical areas of South Africa. These areas coincide with the 
area. i. c omniE:l.n d ::;:. SADF. The JMCs are made up of representatives 
from bu3:i.!"l.:?.·=.:;·::;, commun1ty counci~s, ex-develoamen~ boards, the Police 
Constituted. The tasks of these bodies. which are accountable only to 
the State Securi~y Council. includes asse::;s1ng the security situation 
~;ec Ul'" i t y 
we shai. i. 
i.n 
state of Emergency to regain the politica! initiative in eac~ region. 
Several commentators of the doctrine of 
"Nationdl ~)i;2C:l.Jf"" i ~ ..... ~/ il tc:J ·cr12 eCO!lOffi:i. C: 1 ri 
art i cu:L ,:..t ion (J ;· o·f 1 ai:Jou.l~ 11 bi·?tv~een ~st<::1.·::e a.nd capital in 
the interests of maintaini~g political~ soclal and economic stability 
123). While the state would deal with the ordering and restructuring 
to take over many OT the state's enterprises through orivatisation. 
t.h;::: ''w<:::::~+.::l.i·-;2 11 ·fu.nctic1ns in the 
economy and the tackling of the problems causing social oislocation, 
be dece~tralised away from the state and thus hopefully 
business exoressed most 
thE-? C2-:3.i--l ton 1979 resulted in reformist 
manouevres designed the~ ch-:::\nqed imperatives of monopoly 
----------·------
( 23) W :L l kin ·::;c)n ,, ~=· ;~ il ::)~: r ... :::··.ci ci ::. :i. n r::.i f~(-?a.l j_ t. i E~·::;; ·rh .:-? : ___ ir··lJ .:::t.n F' CjLln c: Ct t i C)n iJ. n d 
Social Chan;e tn Contemoorary South Africa''; African Studies Seminar 
Paper·, V-i:i.·t:;::; .i.'l'C:' 
( 24) L_OtTtb d.i·- ct ~ .J : il r~--1 e c:c C!n CJ:1\ i. c {:·,·=~-0 (::~c t ·:;;; CJ·f f"'·.l-:":3. t i. Oi! -:7~. :;. 
Pol it: ·y· C:cJr-i ~'5 :i. (j ei·- a.·:.: :L (j!"i :3 f! ~ in LCJLll.r.j II i···it--·t ( Cjp II c :f. t a ) j:"J r;2 
same ~1me as stab1l1se tne townshios 
t.CJ 
threaten t~e monopoly o~ b'y" monCipOl 'y' 
capital. 
Thus the most urgent iTif.J\12·5 t~:;s:Jk the quf.?·5tl on of 
legislative restrictions on the mobility, utilisation and training of 
in tc' +D.ci 1 j.i::.s.t;;? the 
production a.l onq tTII:Ji·- E C a.p j_ t C:1.l :;, i ne·s 
Another- maj en·- the free enterorise o1scourse of 
''Tota:l Sti·-,':':l.tf.."!g'y''' ,, qradual reduction of state control of the 
key sectors of the economy and the privatisation drive of the early 
SO's. 
Importantly, one of the first deviations from Verwoerdian logic was 
the a.ll r- e·:st i.- i ct i Cjns on tile i n\/ESttTiEf""lt. by white 
capit.a.li·::;t·:::; in the African townships. It 1s certain tnat this reform 
came a.tj(::>ut not thl'-ougn the demands of black businessmen but because 
caoital eager to get at the Black market. We 
sha.ll ·see African businessmen to 
''free ent.ei'"PJ·-i -:::;,'2 :::>out;-'! A·.f r- j, C:i':i st vl f.?''. 
Issue of the restructuring of tne economy, it 
-several qualifications on the way we see the 
relationship between cao:itaJ. .. while and 
"tearnv~or .. k" tht-? E~t. t: fi f.1 t. j_ Hif-? C)+ 
aa ous1ness real1sed that the 
furtner as a result of t iv:~ 
T.".h1::; 
divisions partiCIAlarly serious over how to deal witn the struggles of 
the masses. Thus it is problematic to see the activities of state and 
capital as working in tune in terms of some hidden agenda. The state 
is no mere instrument in the hands of the most powerful class, but is 
constituted through (and is itself a site of) struggle between the 
classes who enjoy polit1cal access ~o the state; 
between the constituent classes and class-fractions of the ruling 
bloc, although the struggles of dominated classes do impact directly 
on the apparatuses. 
An important digression we must embark on 1s a discussion of the 
progression of government strategy towards urban Africans. 
The aim ot the urbanisation strategy mapped out by the Riekert 
1979 was to resolve tne political crisis in the townships 
by giving recognition to the permanence of uroan Africans and to 
secure the1r economic welfare and social stability by protecting them 
from compet1tion for jobs from the relatively impoverished rural 
With Sf.':'Ct ion 
----··-····-·-····-··-···--·----··-·-··-·-·················-·-····· 
(25) St?e c:c,bt:)f:?tt:., VJ E.·t. ~:11~ li~::)c}U.T.;-, i~~·fr·icc~.;1:3 i:·?F..~l~JiC}r-!-:3.1 E:c:cJ!" .. !C)ffl\.,,'~ t-1 
C:l,.. it i c {:..l .::,rl ~~ 1 .... / :.-:> i ·::; cJ+ i.- t:?·f c>i··- iT! ·::; t i·- €:\ t t.::·q ··:l J. n t. n r:: 1 :.:_:;l]()·s 11 p 3 
•. __ l
An th~::.· 
D1ack Local Authorit1es (bv the Act of that name of 
t983l, wn1ch was meant to substitute in the urban areas for the self-
b'/ ~\·f r- i c.:;.n<:; in the 1' Na;: i on,::..l ~3tates 1', ar·1d serve 
as a replacemen~ for the lack of participation in central government. 
Whi 1 e the new local authorities would enjoy unprecedented power (eg. 
rent, t,3.:·:: and fee collection, the issuing of 11cences etc managed by 
Mricans themselves) they were meant to be self-financing. 
This sophisticated 
n:::oea.ted .;attempts to im;:Jlement a·:;pects o·f the 
strategy. It ha.s:. ·fa.i l e:d largel.'/ beca.use o·f r-esi stanc.-:2 to 
proposals no;: only from the squatters resisting removals, the workers 
tc:; ·i-r '':"f"•·. '.- • ••• 1.1 I I on cou·si ns, and 
organisations of the dominated classes, but also from sections of big 
capi t.<~:L ~'-~liD 
local authorities lie in shambles due to the unprecedented 
mob i 1 :~ ·:;;,::;:t. :i. un nf 1984-1986 against of reoresentivity and 
were forced to imoose as a result of their 
fi seal ba.sE•. 
The state 0as come oac~ ··- ... -·· .... ~--;,,; -:::1. ':::~ !;;-.! , __ : 
not on 
Af r i c: .::-1 '· t.:n.n: on the centres of 
w1ll reolace the ~rovinces as the second tier of 
counc1ls encomoass all local authorities within a 
region~ inc:Lucl1nq 
respon·::;ible +en-· functional adm1n1stration 
repre~:::.ent<.~.t ion. ·- . --i ___ : Cj n ·:::. ! .... CJ .l 
rep1~esentat i. em being 
contributions. However 
I: -~ i If .. .1. .L ~ 
i:.ii:\5f:?d 
aim o·f pl·-c.J-.../i di n':;J tht?. r~+ r- i can 
finance: ,':.<. limited 
tov-mship 
+rom 
Community Councils and are 
a::; opr.Josed to r.:lol it :i. cal 
wn 1 t.'~ ha.nc~-:; .. 
authm- it y' s +3.nancia.l 
~he RSC initiative is the 
bo\jJ. es; with a ::;oui~ce of 
the white areas to the 
township::;. !.i-of>.fl.::.l to this question at a later stage in the 
paper. 
An o·ft.-st:3tt:?d interoretation of ''Tot.:-:..1 :-,as been the 
rttempt to broaden the social base o+ the reform process to include 
th1::? ':F.::lc-~ck Hiic;d1E~ cla·:;·5i'. (27) inclucjeci both 
legislative cnanges and institut1onal interventions. 
The Ri E?kert. tTii:~Cie recommendations regarding 
Af r i L- ""'·- e1··· t ~~ i·"'rJ Pn ,_,, "·- ,_ o, 1 1 _, ....  .... __ --~, ::;) ~ including the ooen1ng of CBDs to all races, the 
standar·di<:;<::\t.iDn o+ i~;;·::;u:i.nq o+ 1 i cencf.?S tcJ qroups anc.1 the 
(2'])-;;~~R·:~-.. ~:~~~~i:~~·:t,j_·-n Cl t.-::J n - -~ =-:.) ~J 1 C:) t:) u c 1 -c. p :·::·~ ~~~ .::'. n Cl i···! F:.· 1.- in -::·t n n c:, i l 1 i C) in e e ; '1 l~ f"i 1?.? 
~Oliti~al and e~onomic impl1cations of co-o~erat.ion or conflict in 
Sollth rHr·:i.c:.3"~ :Ln ~~;::;.:J·-··opt.-:'1'-E•.t.i.c:m c:w- c:c:Jnfiic:t 1r·, ~)Ducner·Tr t-H!'""lC>:'\ ····· ~:.fH7! 
Jl ann i nq i mol :i. c:: <-:o.t ion:::,''; ;::·,.- oc et-~d 1 ~-i ·::J ·::; o+ f.)ec Dnd l~n n u ... :'ll Con+ e1~ enc:E? of 
the Lon~ Range Planninq Soc1ety of Soouthern Africa. March 17 1981 
oi o~sinesses that could be 
owned bv- Africans. fhe Grouo Areas Amenoment Act of 1984 allowed the 
in the white CBDs. Government has 
stated repea~eoly middle c:.La5s 
through the mean:; 
infrastructure and the promotion of black business. 
A cruc:i.al instrument for the implementation of the latter has been 
the sponsc:w·::;h i p 
parastatals, including bantustan Development Corporations, Institutes 
attachf.~d to and the Bu·si ne·ss [)ev·~:el Cjpcnen+.:. 
Corpot-ation. The out of the Carlton Conference of 1979 
due to 1n recent years that a new approach 
was needed sma.ll busi nes·s entrepeneurship amongst all 
copulation (v·ou.r.)s" .. C2:J) of NAFCOC is a member of the 
directors, which is appropriate s1nce most of its loans are 
to African entrepeneurs. 
remiss over support for the development of a 
"Black middle strategists c1ose to capital urged 
that account c:)·f the .::..::.;pira.tion·::; CJ-f this gr-ouping. 
speai< i ng of a. D:i.c\ck 
'' ... tr-, e!·-· t-: i. :3 -::··· q j·-· C:!iN i n ·] p F~t. t ·}..- tJ cJLlt- (J (7?CJ i ~_;; 1 e ~ b 1 •..1. t 
t.i···,F·i!.-· lfJ··::l~31t.it~·5 ~~~z~.n '.JC:) t~:lt:.ht-~i··· v-Jc~.·y·: tht:~·y :···,a.\iE~ tc> be 
compered for. The Black cap:talists proper are safer, 
in 




28) Hud sn,-·,, F' .:~.nd Sa.1·- akin·~;~:: \f, 1··1 ~ '' C l .:;1.·3·5 i ntE?r-e,:;t '::; a.n d po :L i ~~ 1 c:;:;: t:.he 
Case o·f t.ne Lu·-ban ?·i·}:r:ic<:m i::;oL.u~qeDis:i.e":: t:)out:-, p,f!--ic<m F<e:··v·j.f2~->< :~:;, UAF\5 
ill'ld ;:: ... ". - 1.., ·l· c·n 1 r- 1 -rn 1\~~...,'c.t 1 . lt~)~ .. :) rJ ... / '/ 
ext~emely small and almos~ wnollv o~oencent uoon wh1te 
supoort. ~ne cnances oi an Afr1can cao1~al1st c~ass taking 
C] + + i n ·c cJ ·==::. c~ !. f -···· ~::.; i . .J. s T: . .. ::;·\ 1 r··~ 1 n CJ q ,.-· C) ~--.1 t. h ~:.-t r· ,..-~ ~...-, 1 n 1 Hl-=·=·~.1 ~ ~ ..... ~_o . ..J ..... fi~_:?._§ _______ t_t-.... ,_.l_.3~.~-
~~j. ___ ~---~-~:::~·:_:; __ f:i0 .... -.::~:·_!::l.P ..... _ .. ~~~:-.:~l~· .. ::.~~j.:_~;-~ .. A .. :.~-~~~-~-~~~---····t~'--i:.: .... _j:.::.~=:t.f:~ .. -.. ?. \; __ :~?- _\-.. ~----· .:=~~:X:l.9 ..... _.~_C)_j __ :~:~ .. ? ..... -~~--~-.:-.':.:~.-~ . .!.}.~?..~?. 
!·.JXt..'~.':~i~.~:~:\: .. ;:~.. r n i :=; ~·• i :i. l en '3 Lll- (;~ t i·-~ t=! i ,.- :~ ·=· ·.,.· ,:;.. L t '/ b t...t t t r-·1 e i ,.- \i a l L.t e 
as political auxiliaries dur1ng unrest is limited. 
"In tile end the loi,::. . .lt-.,; of the Black middle 
class will depend on whether the government and business 
can meet ~he1r ~is~ng aspirations a~d p~otect them. If a 
reasonable growth rate and a programme of reform is 
maintained, one can expect this middle class to continue 
to adopt a reformist position favouring changes within the 
existent framework. However, the support of the Black 
middle class could abruptly be ended by anything that 
seriously threatened the military or economic stability of 
Sc)tJth i~lfr·ic:.::\. 1' (::-:;:L ~l:L~::;cn.::?e J.C)f31: 15) 
Whi 1 e i. t ~ould be problematic to conflate the wishes and stratagem 
~ a particular class it has been able to achieve, it is 
instructive to observe also what the 1 ea.di:.~i-·::;hi p o·f the monopoly 
capitali::;t class has said at:JcJt.lt the "Bla.c~:: middle class". F{osholt~ 
executive chairman ot Barlow Rand, in a sp2ech in June 1984, that the 
( i n e. monopoly capital) 
depended on the activism and oressure exerted by businessmen. 
''Unless the blacks~~ ~;~ho r-epi·-e·::;ent the majol·-ity 
group, enJoy ~neir fair share of t~e fruits of the system 
- which presupposes they must be in a oosition to 
participate 1n 1t 
( ~~9;. 
t.h.::::--:,; wi J.l moc'5t ce;·-tai n:L y ,.-eject it." 
He advoc;~<.tt-?·s a f i \ie···-~:ii·-cinqt:::rJ a.poi-oc•.ch to the '' Pl'-oi::J l em'': 
<29) 
Ci rcumstance'3 
Club, .JunE~ ~21 
Education reforms, 
-· +..:r-aininq, 
the advancement of blacks into senior managerial 
positions, 
li -;-:.... ··-
!lit:::' role in tne chanqing 
o+ ~::3cJu.th r:·:,+ r- i C<:t. 1' ~ ·~.:;,~:~eec:h to Harvard Business 
1984. Reprinted as SAIRR Top i. c<~.:t 
f3chool 
~ne 2~1minat1on ot OlSCrlmlnatlon from the workplace 
and f i. n.:.:d l. v" 
deal to en:::;u,·-e ·:~:;l ... ti'"·./t·-.;al of tri;:2 fi·-eE:.' er·,·t:el--i:Jlr·is.-:2 s;y·:;tem''. 
As regards the third point above (advancement of Black agents into 
managerial positions) 
dlack of real commitment by the great majority of businessmen'', whi~n 
is an obstacle to demonstrating that the system ''is not just a white 
Apart from referring to NAFCOC specifically, in regard to the fifth 
seems to mean those private sector organisations that 
A·f ;·- :L c a.n eni:I·-ept:-meu;~s. include tt-1e ba.nks; 
Standard's Business Development and Ad\ii sm·y Dept, 
Business Unit, Trust Bank's Bureau for Business Management; organiseo 
.::ommer·ce a.nd institutes as Small Business 
Advisory Services and the Urban Foundation • 
.,.., 
1 ne fO(J·:sL thesE· 1 ast-·-na.med. 
Founda.tion ;:;.r··CJ·::;t:? ou.t o-f CC!ncelr-n in pir-i.va.t.e ci.!·-c:!.f:?~:> about the ''ou.aiit·"!' 
of l i ·f E? in u.i.-ban co,TiiTiLlrl it i es '' and wa·:; e·sta.i:J l :i. si-"ti:?tj c.1·r-: tei.- a cc,n·f er-ence 
held in November 1976. A propaganda leaflet of the Foundation claimed 
it was aim1ng to create a ''free market economy, a stable blacK middle 
Class with the necessary securiTy of tenure, personal secur1ty, and a 
the 1 d•.:•::=: ear1y 30s. ana even acn1eveo some heaowav with the 
grant .i. nq rJ·?· 1n 1 r:. s; 
Firstly~ d·::;, we nave noted above. the reformist momentum within the 
state began problems due mostly + oot--
syndrome amongst non-technocratic. non-
monopoly elements civil service. Secondly, the rise of mass-
based popu:i. i:':l.r- orqanisations committed to establishing participatory 
level the UF'' s 
ability to move into establish a target constituency and 
attemp~: to 
underlying structural causes o+ the problem. 
Ur··ban FrjLtnda.t i C]n lS nov-.; '' enme·:shed in 
~traorcinarily complex set o~ deep-rooted antagonisms and conflicts 
The way that the Urban Foundation has attemoted to extricate itsel·F 
from this predica~ent has been a very soohisticated attempt to attach 
itself t.Cl ·sc~c t i L)n·:; e1:Lt.e Df 
·:::.E7C t (J;·- ·::; are Clpinion-fDrmers 1n the 
potential Clf delivering their CClnstituency. 
to :::~ i ... i n g j_ n ·i::. cJ a. n 
monopoly cao1tal blueor1n~s for the 
future - these h1ghiy secretive a1scuss1ons aimed no doubt a~ carving 
and ·=:; 1 ;< t h :L ·"· 
;uf+ i c 1 ent D ;:) :;. i ·i.: i C: C:\ l. t.C• -'::l.nd 
Huntington included a.s; out. en "1.: j_ O":l • .l ;·-·t::!c I'"" I...\ i. t. s to SI . .J.c: h a coa.l ]. t:. ion ''the 
and A·:;;i an communities, urban middle-class 
Black·:;:;. t.r-:::.c::i t.i. Dl"iC:<:i. ano, ex~ernally, the governments 
of the United ;3tcn-.e·::.; :3.rtd t.l-lP Unit.ec; i<j_ngdom." 
In tE?nns of the sequence of 1--lunt :L n::;JtDn di ·:;:;cu.s:;;es the 
relative effects Ct-f t.hl.-t?e bi·-cJa.d type·:; of ( Di sma.nt 1 i ng 
Political representation) on, 
succe::;::;i. veJ. ·:n p!·-obaiJ 1 e lt-Jhi te resistance, principal black 
beneficiar1es; and in terms of their impact on black impatience. 
He a.;·-·;;J' . .J.e·=::; that the optimum first reform that should be embarked on 
is that of 'dismantling apar~heid'. 
Unfortunately he does not this te;--m implies. I ·f he 
scraoPlGQ of all discr1minatory legislation, he is in fact 
talking ,::;_bou:~. altering the form of state from a two-faced Janus to a 
bourgeo1s democracy. 
He i :; propos1ng a reform coalitiDn c: l ea ..... /a.(_JE~ o·f· 
dominant con~rao1ction, ~o alter tne form of state without 
Changing the oasic structure of power relations~ 
;· ,---
:...~:::)' tncs1s tn1~ p~ooosa1 is oov1ouslv ludicrous. 
u.ncJt-?r the 
technocratic oom~nance oF ~ne m111tary ana monoooly capital. 
restructuring of tne form of reg1me 
"military-industrial complex''• ana an overt. attempt at suoverting the 
unity o·f the 
dominant contradiction, the de-racialisation of national oppression. 
As i1a.cJ out i·t~ li in iJei:v-Jeen and 
practicE~~ practicE-~ is; the pr-incipal aspt"~c:t" (31) 
It is only ir1 practice that v-Je can test the corTectne·;::;s o·f a 
theory. i'1ost of the remainder o-f th 1 s; naper- is devoted to an 
assessm.:=:?n t o+ o·f the ruling bloc's attempts at winning 
over tr1e "b:Lac:k m:L•jCile c: 1-:::\·::;ses il a.nd tl· .. ,e~i r pcJtr:.~nt i a.l t n tei·-~~i~.> cJf the 
orosecution of natlonal-democratic struggle. 
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Since the resurgence of h1storical materialist analysis in South 
~ts application to the social forma~ion. i:hF::: nCJti. on of 
"ColonL:~:Li::;m of a Specic~.l T·v·i:]e' 1 1·1.:;::; c:onsistE·nt1'y~ been attacked by 
local revisionists. inC)·:::;. t CJ f them academics and many linked to the 
nascent labour movement. 
These theorists have argued from a number of different angles that 
CST is an outdated framework that is inapplicable to the present 
highly-developed capitali::;t 
accomodate the develooment 
society and cannot accoun~ for 01~ 
monopoly capitalist relations of 
production~ urbanisation and the rapidly growing class-consciousness 
of the urban proletariat. 
When mo-::;t conciliatory, these critiques suggest a revision of CST 
that is mol-e in line with current conditions - at worst they infer 
that the application of CST to political practice is tantamount to 
selling the workers' struggle down the river. 
Two recent and similar 1nterventions continue this challenge to the 
relevance of CST. Both are directly relevant to our discussion on the 
Posit i or .. ; u+ the ., E:J. ,:;;,c: :.,: since oo~h are d1rectly 
Concerned with NAFCOC. 
In ''C::la.~:;:,.; 1nt8rests and DO!l~lcs: the case of tne uroan African 
and Mike Sarakinsky acknowledge that 
all i. a.ncr:::?::o 
-, .i: 
' .•. }! 
··- -- .. .j •• ·- ·- ...• 
' . .! 1:::: • ... i ~ • .i. 1 .... 1·::.' !.. .. 
jy tne 3pecif1c conditions o~ta1n1ng at a o1ven moment 
in a SC:)c:: i et. \l '' IC l'·r-· .1. '··· J. :~ u.n+c:;r .. t.u.na.t.t~ t:n::-?.n fa.i J. 
speci,~~ condit1ons are in South 
the oolitical position of a class or 
class-fraction. (Hudson and Sarakinsky 1986:170) 
They resort merely to listing a series of examoles of interventions 
~d initiatives of state and capital aimed specifically at easing the 
restrict i. em·:;; on the African capitalist class. fn1s is done in order 
to indicate the changed the middle 
classes a.nci bloc, a relationship that ar-·c1ue ha.:.; 
jenefitted the class and whicn 1s likely to continue benefitting them 
in the ·future. 
11 Inc: 1.- <:-?a·::; i t-i g l ~';; :it ~;,p p e~:u .. - ·::; that. the .:.ip a1,... tt"t e i ;j 
state is capable of absorbing the demands of the urban 
African bourgeo~sie, and that 1t is oossible for ~his 
class to grow both 1n size and power within the oarameters 
o·f ,;:~p.:O!.r-tht.~i d. " 
This, for our authors, appears to vindicate the oosition that 
" it is chimerical to continue proposing, 
and hoeing to see established, an alliance of all 
'nationally oppressed' classes which has as its aim the 
ov·er .. thi'''CJit..J Cj+ .:3.p-:3.t .. ·T:f"le:i.ciu '' (~·lu.c.i·::;c,n and ~3~~.r-a.kinsk-../ 1c.;·~.:::l:j: J.t32J 
t1y m.:::t.i n crit1cisms centre em what has been omitted or assumed in 
this p<:'l.per. a.ttE~mot to a.nalyse t.J-·,e ''soec:ific:: 
c:ond:i.ticm':;" t.hP·/ refer to as influencing the polit.ica.l position of a 
C:lass. I+ su.b .:: ec:t. i \iF2 
~Jective conditions in ::::. ~-,,-· ~ ~":l i~ \/ .... -· ....... ·- ... / jotn at. the overall s•.:r-uctu!·-e of 
relation'.::; 
~ganisa~ional and tnev Houlo have at 
secondly, ~ney unoroblemat1cally a5sume tnat state ana cao1tal have 
in fact acM12veo e~actly what they set out to, without analysing to 
~at extent such initiatives have oeen blocKed~ either by lower level 
intransigence amongst civil servants or corporate managerial strata~ 
~ by organised opoos1t1on on the part of the masses. 
the part of the 'urban 
Mrican bourgeoisie'~ it ,.- -:3. t h t-?1.- like 
irresistibly towards an electromagnet F\ef or·m Dynamo is 
gal v·ani ·sed. They pi~e'ssu!·-·es acting on the 
class~ c":l.nd t.h':? hC)I.-St~=' ·::; mouth why part1cular 
~tions were chosen and what the alternatives were. 
The secor·"j intervention we need to look at is "The i deol og'y" a.nd 
politics of capitalist·5" C3:1.) :i.ll wilich Mike Sarakinsky 
attempt·::; to e;<afiil n•::-: ''how African capitalists have defined 
their interests and political strategies being 
NAFCOC's oolitical has 'tv-Jo according to 
Sarakinskv: +ir·stJ.y a ''r-·e+DI~mi·::;t aopeal to white caoital and the 
the benefits of the emergence of a 'black middle 
c:l ass~~ ; ·:sec: c;n d 1 y· i cit"!nti ·i.:v 1n an a.i::.temo·t. to 
(3?1' f::",~_-,,_"~,-.:-_)·;.._·.,.-_-_. ·.~~------,~, -.--__ :_, -.-·--_,_,_~_.:-_,,_-,:.--:,-. -:: ___ :;-..... - . -,:.-, ,·.··:_··.· . ·.···,- r-, '-··- ,·,·_·,_ ·.1. ·· ··- .... ·• - -- - ·· • ···· ·- · - ~ , ~~~~ Lonqress 0une 0V 0u1v 4 l~U6 
cnmmon tCJ all 
'[C) a. 
relationsnio with of a group1ng of '0ncle Toms' 
:
1 t.:: C)ri C'~ :i. :\. ]. C:'t t C:Jt'"" \f i·- 2-f CJI.- in i ·::~fn ·' tutelage of monCJpoly 
capital. While he ment1ons the conflict between NAFCOC 
and white capital over DE'!!nE~tl~ation of thE~ Bl.:J.C k market, he shrugs 
this of+ con t ,.- c..".l.d i c t i em comoaJ·-eci 
relationhio fostered by white capital. 
NAFCOC's particioation in bantustan and local government structures 
is seen a.-::-; op p C) I.- t u.n i St1l in cwder-
secti onc-11 i ntet-ests". 
Sarakinsky sees the relationship 
cammun :i. t ''/ 1n tei~m-:; o·f it·:; attempts i::.o a.:;set~t its 
leadership over that community. Although he correctly points out that 
NAFCOC has attemoted to harness the power of the community to further 
the interests of the class it represents, he fails to analyse how the 
communi. t.y· ha·:~ 
in a period of mass schools boycotts, consumer boycotts. the collapse 
of b 1 ,:ic k a.nd thf.? de·5tn .. tct ion of many black 
The esc,:':\J -:7:\t i. Dr< ot demand5 by NAFCOC witnessed 1n the recent oeriod 
are j :i. ::.:; m :i. '"'· :;:; E· ,_:j merely to 
enhanci::~ i T~.s; 
In conclu::;i.on~ SarakinsKy stat0s ooli~ical oroqram 
c:ons:i ::;t.~:; of a. !! conc:eJ·""tt ..::d attempt to w1n allies its own 
a.nd ·tr··,.3"i.: t.i""le ''pr-omoticlr, CJ·f t~he l<:.:~ac:iinq l~o:te CJ·f the 
working class reouires that the ideological terrain not be conceded 
to l\II4FC\JC" . of a.l.l 
black c:i.a·:::.s,;::~·s on ;~.:"\.::ii:'IJ. qr-ou.i!Cis'' wo!...tld iT!E:;e1n ·such a conce·ssion. 
Two broad c r- :L t i c i s; m s o ·f Sarakinsky's position I,~Ji 11 dcJ +or nOI.Ai. 
Firstly, Sarakinsky again fails to identify relations of domination 
in bro<.:l.c:ipr- society~ cw investiga~e the concrete effect of national 
oppression on the Black middle class. This omission places him quite 
those who continue to apply an academic and unmediated 
class analysis to tne South African situation. This 1s unfortunate, 
bee a.u s•"" :i. t. leads on ~o the conclusion (erroneous I believe) that the 
bourgeoisie are not only the same as those 
of monopo:L ':I capital economically (which is quite clearly not true) 
jut also politically (ln terms of tne need to suppress combativity of 
the worki.ng ci.c:\s;<:;) 
identifies NAFCOC with the grouping it reoresents. It 
ts Ltnoen:i.a.bJ.•::· that ~he :Leadersn1o of NAFCOC has been associated with 
a con c i J. i ;::•. ·r.: c::· ;--· .... / Ct. D CJ :!. i ·~:. :i. C: ~:\ :i. 
recently this leadership has come unoer severe pressure 
from it.':" membersnip ~o t~~e nc_:ricd~ ac~10n fur~ner ~han mou~hinqs. 
,.. .... -·· .... 
I !• .•• .'· .•• ~·:3.-t.:". tne contrlCU~lon 
them ~AFCOC mem8ers; at ~he level 01 tne ~own3nios. nor the 
the 
organ1sations. He :.:;ees the 
strugq :L e fc.;1'· heqemony· in terms of the middle 
class and seems to lack confidence in the cower of oopular mass-based 
organisations to assert leadership over the small Black miodle class. 
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NAFCOC (the f-,ia.t.icm;:~.l African Federated Chambers of Commerce) 
evolved out of the National African Chamber of Commerce CNACOC) which 
after of a conference in Orlando in 1964. The change 
in name resulted from the reorganisation along regional lines which 
took place in :i.c;;t:;CJ~ after conflict with the Government over 
demand for separate ethnic organisation. 
NAFCOC's objectives have been articulated as: 
"1. To p;~omDte a. spirit of co-·-opei~<::•.tion and 
unity among Black businessmen in Southern Africa. 
":2. To mobili·:se the Black community to~tJards 
self-help and full participation in the economy of 
SDuthel~ n i-4·1: ,~ i ca. 
"3. To fw-thel~ the development. o·f the Black 
business community bv sponsoring needed industrial~ 
commercial and agricultural projects~ collating and 
disseminating information on business matters, awarding 
scholarships, and organising special training courses and 
seminars for businessmen. 
"4. To pi~otect the t-iqht-::; and inb?i~ests o·f 
Blacks in business by opposing measures which directly or 
indirectly obstruct their progress. 
!I ~5. "To Sei·- \iE? C,t. ·:=; the ·::.o l 2 b C"Jd v· ,.- F2D j·- t-?·sen t i n g B 1 ac k 
busi ne·ss i ntel~e<::;ts na.t i onal :1. y. " ( l\!PtFCOC F"i ve·-··Year F'l a.n 
l9D5··-·:!. 990) 
its 
While NAFCOC has sougnt recognition as a chamber reoresenting Black 
commerce, 1t 1s clear tnat there are significant distinctions between 
NAFCDC art •::! insT1tutions sucn and the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinst1tuu~ which cne r·oJ. e 
has p 1 a yF~o:::i in ~he training ano nur~ur1ng of entrepeneurial skills 
the struggle against the legislative and 
l . t 1. ,- ;" 1 ;·4 .; ·:::;;'" ;- .. ··r·] ·- r"'l .!.. ]. nr· pO 1 ·- ...:\ !. ..J .t. ··- .... : .1. I : , I I .••. ·~ .. ••M I 1n ~he economy. While any 
qroup1ng cr str~~um w1ll reoresent the 
~ asp~rant-capi~allst class have been forced to snoulder as much as 
NAFCCJC, :i. n t t::!nn::; of Funct1ons normally the resoons1bility of the 
capitalist state or civil society more broadly. This 1s due directly 
to the structural exclusion of Black agents from access to political 
~d economic power, particularly in terms of the redistributive role 
state ar1d its ability to intervene in the 
reproduction or accumulation of a particular class. 
Thus NAFCOC has many different facets, r1ot <i:i.ll ;·-elated to its 
nomi na.l 1~o1 e as a "chamber o·f commerce". but all 1~el e'v'a.nt to its 
rttempts to carve a niche for the aspirant African capitalist class 
in the South African economy. These include: the oroduction of a 
monthJ.y nv:;.qazine~ Afl·-ican Bu:si.:}_es::;; the initiation and de .... ;elopment of 
Fund which ( 1905) ... 1 w:L 1 .• SDt'JnSol~ 100 ·stuc:ients mal n.l. y· 
a.nd a.t various Southern 
UniveJ~sitie·s and Technikon=.:;"; the establishment of thr:!! (2t.-fi .... ic:a.n 
Development and Construction Company; Blackchain retail chain; NAFCOC 
Agency; and other funds, such as life assurance companies 
~d development corporations. Committee::;" . , oea.l. with 
areas as diverse as Education, Transport and Leqal~ ~::;ti,.. B.te<;JY a.nc:i 
Planninq. 
NAFCOC'5 structures reflect its federal nature. 18 region5, many of 
them coterminous with ha ..... ;e ti-li:?:i.l·- C!I,...Jn 
:tn 
;·- 2r:.i i or·, o:t .;. ·t-· r··; 
L~ecut1ve Counc~l, wn1ch meets everv two years. Sub-
( C:)·f 
Finance~ -:3nd met:?t 
regularly and present reports to NAFCOC annual conference~ supposedly 
the suoreme decision-making forum. The NAFCOC secretariat consists of 
NAFCOC and is based at NAFCOC head office in Garankuwa, 
As in any organ1sation, of power cannot merely be read 
off from the constitution. In NAFCOC participatory democl~acy is 
hardly encouraged, a.nd conference provides the space for the 
rank-and-file membership themselves, and is an important 
occasion ·f o:~ in+ or- .11a t. j, Cln a.nd itsel·f 
publicly. it would oe true to say that policy is decided for the most 
part behind closed doors in the many and varied comm1ttees (both sub-
and ~'3pecial),. ·rhe·=-(~ stl--:...lctLli··-e·:s are overwhelmingly dominated by the 
n a. iTt f:: s t h -3. ·t NAFCOC since it was 
f.ound•;?d ~ tTta.n··./ of them clD·::;eJ.--:,/ J.inked to Bantustan structures. Also 
evident 1 n t.:-1e Spt2c:i.:~.1 are reoresentatives of 
"white caoi·:::.c:: .. l" who due exoertise and training exercise a 
disproportionate influence on the direction of the organisation. 
Thu.·:; nc::,·:: only has NAFCOC in the past been distant from the direct 
its mem~ershio in the townsh10s, it has tended towards 
t:.he a 
rapprochement with whi~e capital as an entree into the econGmy. While 
54 
j\j;._:y; r .•....• .-!._.·I .L '·· 
~treoeneurA~l cia3s could be he~d accountable ~o ~he community as a 
come :tnto c:clnf.L:Lcc. w:i. t.1···1 
organ :i ·:=;at. i Dr• s. 
NAFCOC's a1m to represent the b lac: f:: tr·adin•:;J and 
nationally :s unchallenged (other organ1sa~:on::; such as the National 
Taverners Association A+r·ic:,~~n BLa.ck Taxi Association are 
occupation-specific ~ut elljo·y· close links with and the 
~ganisation is treated as such by both capital and the state. While 
the oi~Qi3.nisation can point to onl';i "al~ounrJ :l~) :::::00" paid--up members, 
~ executive spokesperson pointed out th,:.~t ,:.~:=.;::;oc: i e:-..t.es and ''·fri en.js '' 
could bt.trnp up suppcr-t. to ".::-round :::::c) t)()l) !I (331 out of a 
stratum o+ African entreoeneurs estimated by the Economic 
Committee of the Pre::;ident.'s Council to number 100 340 in 1980 (34) 
NAFC!JC :i. nc:J. u.de<::; 
Tra.nsva.,:-..1 ~ and Ui\iiCOC, the ''col ou!-ed '' ci·1amue1~ o-t· Comm•?i~ce .:]n the i:;:and 
of NAFCOC members by occuoat1on is instructive. Out 
~ a representative sample of 5280 NAFCOC members <see Appendix 1) 
4772 could be classe•j as retailers or general a low 
level of caoital necessary to initiate the business, at the same time 
a high C:l.S 
134) Race Relations Survev 1984 p224 
. /; t .. 
. L -rL.I 
. ~·'· c:: C:) 1 :;, i:':'!.l~ 
profess1onals, consui~ants (oost-·secondary education, 
at one remove from township economy) 
Th:i.s wou.l,j ind1cate that over 90% of NAFCOC membership is based on 
~e periphery of the economy, that verv few are in fact owners of the 
to vagaries of the economy. The overwhelming 
vul ner !"::tb 1 E·? t CJ \.'i:i. th!-,ol di nq c!thel.- Oi.-
spontaneous action. 
Although the small size of the constituency that NAFCDC represents 
the i moe;·-·f ect and contradictory manner in which it 
interests militate organisation being a 
coherent political "l::.he .l e·~:;·:; been an 1. mpm-tant 
ideological symbol contested over by organisations and 
force::; of a.nc:i 1 e+t. Thi ·s 15 mainly because of its 
reoresentative of 
maj cv :t t / ,. t.ht? ''B:t...:.~.c::k 1Tt(:ider-c:\i.:es:.' 1 wn 1 ell the capi ta.l have 
p.::!.rt i c:ul '"'·'~·1 v since the onset o+ Total 
Stra.tE~gy. 
generally enjoy a degree of legit1mac:v amongst sectors 
townships, particularly 
aspirant petty-bourgeols elemen~s, who not only regard NAFCDC as more 
more c~allenging to the regime than other so-called 
" mo (j e t· ~.=t t. E·) .i. i::? .. ::\ Ci E·~ '"" .. ·:::; ' 1 0ut are impressed with the economic: progress made 
It is as oifficult 
NAFCOC'' ~; h:i. :;,·c-.Clr··v a.·::; it .!. ::· tc:J 
t:="i. ._JC) 
interpretation of 
academics to agree on the role of 
the middle classes. Within NAFCOC itself there are widely divergent 
opiniDns regarding the recent pas~. 
,nouthp i ece o·f NAFCOC, saw the organisation as part and parcel of the 
~road Black Consciousness Movement in the earlv 1970's, and as such 
it was concerned to build Black unity and make demands on the state 
for t h e l i + t i n g o-f restrictions. However he sees a turning point in 
the wake of thE· 1976 uprising and the formation of 
Foundation, when the leadership of NAFCOC decided to participate in 
the struc"..:u.t-€:~·::3 =::;et up to ;J;:::vt::J.o~J T..r··,t:? ''Dls.c:k m1.c!dle class''. 
1nterested 1n real fundamental change - they felt that big business 
characterised by political quiescence and conservatism on the part of 
u.ntil the··y 
that the Urban Foundation could not commit itself and was not 
its pE:t.+.xoni·::;ing attitude". (F'el·-sonal Interview 
16. 1 n 87) 
In contraoict1on ~o thi3 
t::'':-
....!1 
:~.·::; c:i·-i·c.ic:a.1 t:Jf see0 the recent political impatience of 
NAFCOC statements as nothing ou~ ~· :tn _f-::~.c:t. 
continuity with NAFCOC's history: 
''I+ )iOI...I. 1--,~-~-:·::..d <JLu~· s~:H2E·:~cr·,e·:~; ··:lC:rU. 1,~-.;:i. 11 see t.r-·,a,t we 
have never really been tolerant. The Press has suddenly 
discovered NAFCOC .... but for all my years as President 
~'ie' \fe bE~i:':.~n t~.t:;c. a.::; C:TJ.tical. of trie i.Jo\"'.:?i·-ntnent ••.• and 
WE~'Vi'? i1t=!lci meetinq'"' v~ith t.r1em at the hiqr1eo.:;t. levei. to tell 
t r·i E·:m •• " ( ;:::•et·- sc:;n a]. I 1"""1 t t:.:?r- ·v· i. e~-J 23. 1 • 87) 
Ethnic Commt=:;;·-c('? ---------
Motsuenyane likes to recall, as an example of NAFCOC standing up to 
Government~ the conflict of 1969 over the demand from the state that 
NAFCOC reorganise along ethnic lines. 
!;1-...jAi:::·coc wa.·s cou;·-ageou.:; enCJu•:.:Jh not to do 
that •••• M C BDtha refused tCJ talk to us- for seven years 
they refused to talk to us •••. Tnat is part of our 
hi 5 t CJi.- ·y· ~ !I ( F'eir' ·?;on a l I nt 21'"'\/ :L eif-.. i 2~: n l. 87'; 
This highly romantic rendition of the conflict is common to NAFCOC 
1976 Motsuenyane sPoke of "the consensus \ii e!rJpoi nt 
NAFCOC into ethnic components would certainly kill the 
What is not SD often mentioned is the pseudo-compromise decision 
reachE-:d that l .. ~t~rc:clc: W(Ju.:t d establish regional chambers of commerce. 
The pragmatism of the decision is revealed in the +ollOit,Jing~ an 
excerpt from the Pres1dential Address given 1n 1970~ 
(35)~~;~---(:~ t:·:l r:~ C:~] C: -;---
8
;::. i:1 i.: ~-i ·; .. CJ F' r·· Ci Cj t·- €7! ·:~; S ~ 
Oevelop;Tte;··it." ~ .~;c:iri<:innec';:J,_u .. -·=.:J J.·~hJO, p8 
, .. ,.i ... -·· f-3. .c) .t. .,.._;, 1._ r:. 
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·' · r1 e J. i::i e.~ {·:1. c1 t: f.::.··::;;-~:. -:·:·~- D :L .l ·:::. il 1 ii q ·.-· ~:-?!! q .i. D i ... , ~-:~ .. : c ;···i ct. tTl tJ e ,.- ·::; w a. ·:s 
a.cce~Jtf~~=t as an at~emu~ to m~et ~he De~uty Min1ster's 
prouasal 1n uart: as a mean~ of atcaining a more effective 
CJ ;-··· ~:.1 C:'1. n 1 :~; .:·:t. T:. 1. C] il C1 ~- f) l J ir· D i~-- CJ \./ 'i. 1"1 C: i. -:::\ ]. C h -:J. ill [j E' ,.-· ·:::~ :; -:·:·:·,_ n ci E:\ 1 S C) t (~1 
.f.£::.~_:_j:. .. -~- \.i;.i:~.t~·::~~-..!.:;.~;l_..::i~~-~~-~~~-C .. :-:~ .. t~ ... \.E~~-:~:! ....... E~.j~----···SJ\.-.t:.t: ______ qx:~ .. 9.:~~~~I) :t. ::2. ~·::1. t:. .. :!:._~;}Q ....... ~~-J ... t-. .t!.. ..... t . .!J .. ~ 
j~~--:~.~--~~:.~Z~.f.~) .. :~: ... l· ... ::~: ....... ~:-~:.: .. ~?.f.:!.:~.~-:i;_j __ .:t~ .. Li. t-.. f.~_~:j_ ..... !; __ ~::~.~~.-.-.r:: ... :.i .. __ }; __ ~-~x.-.~ .. J ..... ::::3.J ...... ?:.~-.. }.:~;.:_!)_~;2_c __ :.i .. _:t:-... !· ... ~~--~--- --~-:;_t~.x~.-~;_:~.~·;}_g_t:~ .. ~.~-~ ... ~.t. 
t.E) .. ~?. .. _ .. x.-.-.. ~-~;·-~·.-.-.i:J? . .J .... t.~.-~ .. -.~-~---· ( ::::. t":J ) 
An important sector of NAFCOC's memoership nas always been sited 1n 
the bantustans. Although not as vocal nor as economically muscular as 
the F\and c::h a.mb 21' .. ·s (J-f= have always been an imoortant 
conservative counterweight to the impatience of the urban traders and 
~trepeneurs. In these areas. tne relationsnio between NAFCDC and the 
bantustan governments has oeen important for both parties. 
The intensification the 1950's included 
increasing restrictions on the African traders in the urban areas as 
pt--·E~p-:3.i·-ed t.cJ r·ici 11 White ~3CJL.ttil f::1+ric::a.i! of permanent black 
this apcroach was official assistance 
~d patronage of the Black commercial .s.nd mostly 
through the medium of the various Development Corporations. 
t.:h('2 C:i. '3i<ei 
Corporation to the LlSKei government identified one of the objects of 
·----··-·-··--·--· 
:~:)N=~~~~=~Y~~~~c=~e~~~:~~~a~fAg~~~:~~es~:~n2~n7~;~~C~~:~:~n~~ 






t. ·* / l 
Th i ·:; 
th1:? I)e··./e:L c;pint-:~n-::. <.:•.no white 
( pr-edom:i. nantl. ·/ capital The 
have centr-ed ciear-ly on e~tr-acting the 
-:su.;·-ol u.-s +;··om the decentrali-sation 
rtate's neeos have mere1y been the creat1on and reproduction ot an 
economic base for the ban~ustan r-egimes. The articulation of these 
imperatives have often been in contradiction with the desire at an 
aspirant commercial bourgeoisie for autonomy and economic space. 
Thus there have been from NAFCDC to 
competition from white cao1tal, as indications that NAFCOC 
has at times not been satisfied with the quality of leader--shio in the 
jantL.tstans. 
The ''t.r-ipar··t:itt::> ·:..:;ys-i::.em'' in business was to enter 
three-way partnershio with the government corpoi·-ation·:s a.nd white 
capital in indus~rial enterprises was severely criticised at times: 
''i;.Je tni.nk i.t v~i:LJ. b;·-·in<:;i <-:?1•ements o·t: White 
domination into the homelands and we are tired of any form 
of dC:)lTJi na.t:. i. 01-, !' 1.1-Je a1·-e nc:>i.: going to all o~<.J it ••• '' 
( !vlt:J-i:SU.l;?ri\j.::•.f"ie i Cj''/" .. ,S) (:~~;g) 
role ot the Bantu Investment Corooration was seen as 
unproduc:ti \re: 
!i ., • 1 n .:::t ·:::; ~: .:-J.i·~· ;:·:..-~:~ D i·- C).,i i c~ ~- n q t· u.n d :::> ~ " :• .. 1 t. h <::~·;::; done 
its best .•.. But wnen we come to the question of creatine 
t~e BiacK man, ou1ldtng h1m up~ outt1ng n1m 1nto a 
posit1on where ne coulo, after i7 vears, be ~rained to do 
what the BIC is try1ng ~o oo today. when it comes to that 
I .:3.m sot·-~·-·y· i::.o ~;ay thdt ••• it. hds lc:l.mE~nt<:•.bl\; fa.i lf.:::d. '' (i3,J,J 
Le·so.i..:tng o+ r\lr:::H:~coc) <:::::9) 
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NAFCOC Wds critical also of the state's use of yes-men African 
bUSinessmen as ~oken reoresentdtlves of their interests on bantustan 
!I •• n De-..;el opment BD<::l!·-cis ,:::;.t·-e u·sLloJ.J. 1 y ·:;toe kE2Ci v·4i th 
politically symoa~het1c businessmen, not necessarily 
businessmen who are competent to make a contribution at 
th2:1.t :L•2\./t?.l." <i"iatsuen':t'a.ne 1976) 
And again in 1978~ 
"Same o.-F out- m•::::mbet~s havf:.' been e]. ectt:~d to sei·-ve 
on the boards via the party in some areas. They have not 
been the best people that we know, they have been people 
very much inside the carty framework, people that we 
cet·-t:ainly v~ouldn't t~ecomrnf.?n•j ••• '' (i":ot·:~.uenya.ne 1(7'78) (L~O) 
In some cases bantustan governments have put pressure on their 
commerce to seceoe from NAFCDC, because of the threat it 
Joses L"JDt.n to thE·i ,.- 1 CJCCI.J. legl~lm.:::iC':f" and their claim to be 
1. {~·}f:~() n .:3. t i on-:'3.1 conference 1t was revealed 
branches operating in the homelands were being 
''har as-,s;,eti '' b '! r.om;;;~:L a.ncl i.JDVer nrnf:?n t s. F·,~e~~.:i. cien t i"i~:::"tngoo e, who op enerJ the 
-~; "t . . :::.. t e d government would the 
~phuthatswana Chamber of Commerce <BDCOC). (42) 
(40) i.bid p 27 
c:a.p it ::::\.l i srn 11""1 rt f ,,~ ~~- c.: -=~- i I 




... tni~ 13 one of cne 
1mposed on NA~COC 1n some areas in order for it to 
also stressed the importance of neutrality in homeland squabbles. 
NAFCDC has undoubtedly co-operated with the bantustan system 
insofar as the bantustans have provided an important economic base 
for the nurturing anc reoroduction of a commercial petty-oourqeoisie. 
Howeve, .... it that NAFCOC has 1n the past fended off and will 
in the future react strongly against any attempt to deprive the urban 
black population of its permanence, or to assert that the political 
rights of urban Blacks are to be exercised in the bantustans. 
When in May 1976 the lifting of restrictions on urban traders had 
as a prerequisite their a.cqt.ti ·::;i ti cJn c>+ homeland citizenship 
certificates, ie. a renunciation of their claims to urjan permanence~ 
NAFCOC reacted strongly, both itself lambasting the government far 
its "tr·e.:3.ChETy" -:3.nd mobi1i·:sing ·::;u.ppo;--·t +rom white capita.l. (f.j.4) In the 
face o-F :i.n the \3oweto 
uprising, the state dropped this reou1rement and began to recognise 
the needs of urban tracers and NAFCOC as their representative. 
-·---·-·--.. ---·-.. ·-·-··----·-·-···--·-···-
(43) in ''F'<:•.tr·, to F';···ogi~e~:;s'' p27 
\<:et-?D l t:·~, ::~;: .l {~ hi ·:;tot- >l .:J·f 
i!J it.·::::. 1 r.7'F~2 p 362 
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Just as ~he oantu3~an ~truc~ures orovidec orotection and assistance 
~d access to ca~1~al and ooportun1ties for the aso1rant commerc1al 
bourgeoi~le~ so too nave the structures of urban representation meant 
for the state a chance to establish patronage systems ultimately 
dependent on the state for reproduction and accumulation. The state 
has in e~::;senc .. =~ ,;~.tterT1~Jt.E~d t.D ciupl ic<:•.te the ''indil~ect r-u:Le'' o·f: the 
bantustans in the urban areas, to establish a subservient commercial 
class similar to that in the bantustans. 
After the meeting with NAFCOC after SowetD, the Government sent a 
directive to all local Bantu Administration offices to work in close 
consultation with NAFCOC branches on business matters. However NAFCOC 
was not satisfied with the nature of consultation and urged the state 
" .•. to extend to Blacks the right to participate in and determine an 
sy·steiTl cJ·f 1 ocal admi ni s:;tra.t ion in the u.r-ba.n 
area::; .• " ( i<eeb 1 e 19El2: 339) 
The system which resulted (established by the Community Councils 
July 1977) was received without rejoicing by NAFCOC. Not only 
did the fl·:7?~;J Communit.\/ Cc•urtc:il·:::; :-,ave 1imitr:::~d powr?:!!i~·:-:; (as few in ·fact a.s 
the smouldering Urban Bantu Councils) but Black opinion was not 
canvassed when the Councils machinery was conceptualised. Moreover~ 
to ethnic distinctions~ 
Which at this stage ~as bound to condemn any proposal in the eyes of 
the 1:-:,.' '.•L •"~ ••• -._ !,-:·. ,-, "J) 1 l )• t y - C::L'I ffid! . ·- • 
GraduallY• as the state forqed ahead with the Councils system and 
attempte·cl to lure participants in the tace of community indifference 
tcJ 
. . .. 
DenE~+ 1 t. ·:; 
·"!·· 
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/\ .·- ··-r·l• .... 1 ••• C) f >.lpgraded 
self financtng au~onomous 1oca1 au~horitJes Tne maJor reason for the 
shift in att1tude Towaros the system seems ~o be the cowers that were 
ter-m:::; of th·? 81 ac k ~-CJC: <:"~.1 f:~u. t h CJ!'" i. t i f?~S f:'.Jct to the 
Councils from the Aominstration Boards, particularly those related to 
licensing and allocation of business sites (Keeble 1982:342) 
Most businessmen ~no joined the Councils saw them as a vehicle for 
irnp ro-.ti ng the lot o~ African business in the various areas. For many 
this cie~ci~:;iun was clothed in righteous terms of representing their 
constituencies, or in terms of a 
" ••• commitment to i nc:~ement<:-:J.l and ameli orat.i ve 
change in township living conditions coupled with the 
belief that their participation might also secure 
r:)c1l i tica.]. c:h~::,_nqe E:\f.: a. V~ldei~-, n.3.tion~:\l le\/el 11 (..::.l5) 
Thus Steve Kgame, president of the Urban Councils Association of 
South Africa CUCASA): 
11 
... • we ca.n e·f:fect.i-...lely st.a.rt b-y· L.tsint".;J the 
exis~1ng councils as agents of develooment ... for real and 
meaningful negotiation between the black masses and the 
central government in whom we find so many 
mi~::;takt:?'S .. "(.i.t::oid) 
The Blac:k petit-bourgeoisie are orooortionately overrepresenteD on 
the Community Councils, and example from Tumahole in 
Sf2em·::; t 'y'D :i. c:: <~.1 : councillors elected in tne + i r-<.::;t. 
spate o+ e i eci.: ion:::; u.n d e1,.. the Loc:al Authorities (1983-84) included a 
School princioal, a nur-se, a compute!~ operator, a skilled machine 
multi-outlet trader and a taxi operator. While only the 
---·--··-·-----··----···-·-··--·--·--·--·--( 45) ]. [") L.JI I-~)-· i-· v- .,· ... , ... - .::•' 
. I 1 ·--~~ ~-·' 1 It .. t' .. :::r ~ I \ to i ___ i f F~ a.+ t. e r··· i:.J. dC: i< 1 C:)CE:"!. J. 
9ovei·-nrn.-::::nt:. '' ~ u.nnu.b l i ·:::.itE:c:l ~t-..iCJJ .. - k i J""l!=:i dc)CLtrnent" Dt-:pe:\i·-tinent c)·f i)t.?"/~·:?i cJpinertt 
Adminis~rat1on ~nd Politics, Un{versity of South Africa (1985) o4 
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cf the others 
enJoy a formal 1ncome reia~1on co tne mass 01 res1oen~s 
and LntCJ ;:Jetty 
The real reason for the enthus~asm amongst bus1nessmen and asp1rant 
petty accumulators for part1cication 1 n th1?2 
-~ . .. .. . 
L.:,:JL\nc: 1 .L ::.; .L 1 es i.n the 
potent :i. a:i. f m··· political cowercase 
within the towns~io community. that cou.nc :Ll mem!Je;~-s are 
often put up for the job by businessmen who remain in the background, 
enJoying a symbiotic relationship "c~onnecti.ons" on the 
councils. In return for the gran~1ng of licenses and the provision of 
inside information, 
kind. 
An example from the Vaal Triangle bears this out: 
"j·•!r- :<osil,::mg Ca. councillm- in opposition to the 
ruling bloc on the Vaal council] said that when a business 
was advertised for occupation, the 'favoured people knew 
in advance of the official announcement that they had been 
granted licenses. They openly boasted about it and to 
prove their ooint they would immediately ~hrow braaivleis 
oai·-·tJ.es +or thf2 e:<~:-:cu.tive memb(?.r of the council'' (47) 
network. although by the coucils 
cJ·f the political vacuum in the townships in 
the 60's and after the Soweto uprising. Into this vacuum nas steopec 
a stratum of petty accumulators, characterised by Seekings (Seekings 
---------
(46) SeE?k:i.ng·::;, . .J: '' Pt:~·fCJI--m~ r-ePI'"E'':::;sion ;:: .. nc:i t~l(:O? c:h;:;.nginq po:tit.lC:<3.l 
terTa.in in ~3outh f71-fir·ic:a''s black tov~liShip:s"; pape1~ Ol~e·sented to ROAPE 
-Centre of African Stuc1es Conference on 'Pooular struggles in 
Mri~a·~ September 1986, University of Liverpool 
t.CJ E.,::=.t.a.bl ish an 
alte~nat1ve ~1erarchv the oa~uia~ mass-
weo ~~ roo~ec 1n strata 
the shebeen-owners, retailers. nurses and teachers. strata 
with a relative autonomy from the mainstream economv and the ability 
to e:-:tract ·t.he i n'i.:.et'"St:. J. CF.~S ;::?c: cJn Oin\y .. , 
throug:-; i:J c:o·:.:. i .. , informal sectors. They alsD have links with 
the lumpenoroleta~ia~ ano 1ts underworld. Thei~ ~nteres~s lie for the 
mo::;t part. and they have tended any 
initiative that threatens to rock the boat. 
This web, although tenacious and ubiquitous, has a fragile nature 
and 1t·::; holci on severely cnallenged by the 
Community Councils system and their collapse 
nationaJ.l\/ li'"! -i:he LJi2i.-i CJCi ·-From r1.,:;, '/ 1984 onwards, and by ~ne rise of 
C::•l-ga.n j_ :::;.:,:;.t ions participatory democracy, non--
collaboration with state and accountability of all to 
the communi tv·. 
NAFC::oc me;n':Jei·-s local chambers as a whole have been linked 
cl oseJ. y t.o thr.?. u.m-e;:we·::;ent<:;i.t i ve counc i 1 s ::;y~:;tem, (Hump hi~ i e::; 19Ei5: 17J 
1':. :i. ed :i. n to the "!:E:l.tn::ma.(!e netwo1·- k" in \/cH'" i ou.s; 
ways. While the response of several sectors of the asoirant-bourgeoi~ 
attempt.::;, t.cJ an•:i Dl'">je;~· sometimes in an argan1::;ed form 
D t h e t ... ·::; ;--; .,;:~ \f F.:' saug~t, 1n the c::on~ext of an aooroach by 
'=ommu.n i. :.: ·:; the 
cam~aigns of democratic 
66 
wnoie n3s na~ to define a oosi~ion which 
ser~e 1~s 1n~eres~s. oo~n long and ~hort-te~m. as well as 
®[.~9_b:_~ n _(;L ... :t.b_§?. ____ g_p_§?..r.J .. :L. .. 0..9.. ..... 1,1p ___ o { ____ :l;lt§? ___ l!l.~.cJ~.§.t .. 
de-...;}.E~.t:Lon::> 
by the 
of ~estr1ctions on the entry of white caoital into Black 
or. numerous occasions arousea the vi ~--ul t:.!nt. 
opposition of NAFCOC nationally and many local cnambers, exposing the 
contradiction between the interests of white cap". tE•.l and those o·f 
"Bl ac: k cap :i t-~.1'', wi1ich ~.:he 
Resistance to ~ne untrammelled white capital led to the 
requiremer·;t b':l "i:.he f)~~pE~.r-trrlent o·f Co··-·op er-a T.. ion and Development that 
on the basis of a 49% holding, 
the res;t ~elonging ~o African businessmen. NAFCOC's attitude to this 
was cJ.ea;r·j_·./ rl(=.?gative: 
" •.• until Bl-9.ck·5 are allo~rJed to tt~;:._de -freely 1n 
S A and all existing barriers imoeding their participation 
in the country's economy are removed, it is altogether 
unfai~ and morally unsound for white bu:;inessmen to be 
allowed wnolesale and unconditional entry into the BlacK 
C\i_ ... t::~ E~. :s i! • ( i·· .. ·lcJ·i.:. ·:3L.ten ·::l a.r·l e -·- ~=· !.- e:-; i c:i en t t ,31 Ad ,j ,--~??·s ·5 1 '7'7::3) ( Ll-8) 
For the next two years NAFCOC and many regional affiliates resisted 
comoanies. However many individual traders 
partnerships agains~ NAFCOC policy. H~ the 
74-s~· J·. r·l -.· •• :-_ ,:_-: __ ;----~-,-•. -_ .._:_:_ .. -. -.--.-.. ---... -.. -· 
c\ \-.:'. ~_.. t::: F~.: F:.· l E:'. t :L c::i n ·:::; -~ ·-.. -; ·-:·· u.,::.L·_:, 
African/~~tte oartner3nips under certain condit1ons. These Included: 
d1scrimina~ory requ~a~1ons ana polic1es affecting 
* that African businessmen trading ln African areas be orotected 
~ainst unfair comoetition from ~hite bus1nessmen; 
* that partnerships shou!d not be imposed on Africans, but left to 
emerge naturally; 
* that as far as possible~ business partnerships should be free 
from government participation; 
* that the primary objective in any partnership venture in African 
areas ·should be to max1m1se jenefits to Africans. Partnerships should 
not always be thought of in terms of African and white; 
* African/white partnerships should be fairly extended to both 
Mrican and white marKets. 
Often white capital, imoatient ~o ge~ at the Black market and 
at tt:~mp t :[ r··p:;~ to a-...;oi d the wrangles launched against many 
•:omp.ani•?f·s b·y· r-~~"-lFcoc:; .,:o.nd affiliates, used willing black 
' --F ,.-em t ·s' ·f o;~ its own enteorises. its 
especially in Soweto where the Soweto Chamber of 
Commerce a.:1d Industry <SOCOC> was under stiff competition from front 
companies, campaigned aqa.i nst the 'fronts' as well as the equally 
SOCOC sent a teleqram to the Minister of 
Co-o· o=>·~ .,i .. · ·; - ·- -• ·-·--·. ""'' --, .. · ·- ·-.;.. · "'' t ' h P--• c, .... .J.Lfl c;~_,;.._, L~.:··-t•.-.-... tL.• 1 . .~tnf.-::l;c. <::;a··,.-1nq ·~...;-li::l- -: ey 
11 c"Jp p cJ·::.lf2 th 1;? .t:~·~·?:/:·····~5 ~~- ·;:: ·5c 1"'1 ;~ri:e + CJI,... tj 1 •..1. ·:;in e·::;;·::;es~ II ;r~F:: 
believe tne scheme will destroy the livelihood of 
~nousands ot Soweto ~racers. We urge you not to do 
anvtn1nq ~o furtner aovance ~ne scneme. oeno1nq 
;···· i::? D ,.- (·:·:~ ·::; t~ n ~.: ,·::\ t 1 c~ n i 1 ( 5 () ) 
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In :L 9H L NA~CDC affil1ates ooJec~eo ~o ~ne 49-51 scheme 1n Soweto, 
....... . . 
;:::. 1. 1 ;: ,·:3. D .:.:: ·;_: n a.nCJ 1n tr1e 1 ssue of 
participat1on 1n such oartnersnios really blew up in 1983. In mid-
NAFCOC members qave evidence before the 
~cnom1c Affairs Committee of the President•s Council, to tne effect 
that the practice of cartnershios disgu1sed the fact that independent 
businessmen could not compete with the better·-financec and more 
• ' I . 
~per~ par~nersn1ps. tile time, a remark by David Thebehali 
('mayor' of Soweto) that some of these people had themselves entered 
into partnersh1ps went unnoticed C52) In November NAFCOC was forced 
to c.:d 1 for a boycott of the newly formed company Afrimet Ltd, a 
African traders and Metro Cash i::l.nd Carry 
established on a 51-49% basis. This partnership carried extra sting 
for NAFCOC and its policy since the Afrimet compny was in direct 
competition with the NAFCOC retail chain, Blackcnain and had in fact 
~tained two trading sites that Blackchain had bid ·f 01~. 
confusing the issue was the fact that several 
including 'Jela. l<fa.ai (chaii~ of SOCCJC), wi1o had gi\len evicjence to the 
C:CJiTtiTi i t:. t. C:~e !I centrally involvec in the 
~-----·······-··-····-··---·-·--·-···-·····-·········-···-
(50) in :Lr]i3(J ;.:.:.:::~.ct"? r::~t:.:~J.a.ticJn:::. ~)L\1..-\iE'l p129 
151) in 1981 Race Relarions Survey p 163 
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lJ.ji tn \ie;-· ... , c:~J.1]. n fF21'··::; iJDUI~iniJ 
to 1 nc:: i c-:D.t.t::.a ;:: OUI~ of the 
part1cipan~s ~Messrs. Kraal, Maoonya~ Pooe and Masnile) were expelled 
Commerce for their part in 
Af r i mE~t • 
The basis tor ~AFCOC's ObJeC~lon was not all founded on moral 
princioles. Motsuenyane admitted to tne Financial Mail that a major 
~ur to the boycott was tne threat that Afrimet posed to Blackchain~ 
~d did not hesitate to defend the partnership between Roberts 
Construction and the NAFCOC subsidiary African Development and 
Constl~uct ion Company. 
"This is a n1gnl}i speci,::\1isF2d, sclohis-;ti.c.::~ted 
area - it's in retailing that we totally oppose white 
inv·,:Jl\/err,er ... t o·t· a.rt\/ kin,j~~ 1; (53) 
The upshot of the Afrimet affair was that Metro withdrew from 
AfrimE-·t~ .Lea\/lnq the R490 000 investment in Afrimet in the hands of 
directors as a loan repayable over While 
~tro would continue to give management support to Afr1met, 
~uld end after five instead of the original 20 years. The number of 
~ite directors was dropped from four to two to serve in an advisory 
capoacity only. 
The Metro MD admitted they had learnt a lesson -
"If 'y'DU ~'"i,::~nt to do busi ne·ss in (~·f ,~ i ca.n areas, 
let Africans ao it. Metro went in with the best of 
i.ntentior·,;::.; <'=•.nc; got thE2il~ +inC!E.'I'-~7> bu.i·-nt''. (~')4) 
--:::---- --·---·---
(53) 1·-· in a.n c i .:.:;. l i''"'\.:::a. i 1 i···4C;\i(:.7.·in~] et· 1 C:f83 
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.:~.' i t •. .l them, has 
cont.1 nueei t 1 1 :i 
but 1t 1s far more 
likely that the interests of eager wni~e businessmen w1li oreva1l. 
The A!)CC connect i. on :-,as, oredictably, not plain 
August 1 c-i86 to i n\;ol vement of ADCC's 
holding company ADCH in the leasing and marketing of a large shopping 
i"ii dw,3.y ;-.;:;.i J. V·Ja.·y station 3outh f?ast o+ Soweto. i::)i nee the 
centre kJas technically ou~s1oe the ~:lm'ieto boundary, it escaced the 
orohi bi ti on on 51-49 partnershios. However, the threat this posed to 
the township itself resulted in an unorec:edented motion 
~ protest from the Soweto Chamber of Commerce : 
It is 
"i) Wet-eject. the p,3.te;~nali5tic~ and p;··-ef:;c;·-J.pti..,/e 
manner in which the project was conducted and introduced 
to local business whereby 1oca1 business is being invited 
to participate in an already 'cooked' scheme. 
~-~.t.i...L. __ HtU. l.::.s t t h e;_c: C.~§_t.:..:"L!?D. __ gj:_ __ § ___ n ClD.::r._§ c i.i:l..l...!L 
g_gl}l c~:;.C.§.:t_:.Lf: ____ f~::::J_'-::.\.l:..tLf.}±-t:::i: c a,. ___ L=i __ q_g_t.§Y§!.J...!J __ !,JJ..§.. e fl~I_:_~u.;::_t:!i.!!..f'::I..!..t.._~;:J + 
~j ___ g _____ t.?_!}.::.-?jX!.§..:=.!_§. ____ ;trL.9 .. 1.2.~L-._l~r...~.2.§..._ .. 2D ..... ..2.L"J_L_._t_gx_:-_!}l§ __ '2.b_g.h\ 1 d i;l e 
9_.~L:_;w~:.~.Q~ .. ~-~:Mf:!:.9.~~!;1._:-___ ... f.).1?. .... _.L~' .. 9.!:J}1.S~.J.: .. ___ §S;._gJ."J .. Q.!T!i._~;; ___ [i_£~t-· "t. n e l':.:§.t·, i .9_ i n _ a:. 
P..~.:;!_L\._:t._t:::;_~J_:~J ... L ... §:t.:JD~.~l:::..!D.~lL_.f;, o LLth._. AiJ:::..if..:~L-i s __!._1.9I!..::-2.~..Q.§j~:;.?.l we ~~ e i e ct. 
:t:l:l.t.:=:; ____ g_[Q,L:~:.(,;_ ~~ .!._ 
"iii) We vi E~l.l'.) the oroj ect as crema.tun? a.t T..in·::; 
D o i n t L"J E-? c <:.. u. ::; e ~'i h :L l ·::; t t r1 i=' p :~ E! ~§ n t _p.J.::l t!:..:t_i!;.2.1:..l .. ~£!;LIJ_ o '] .. L~. 
g_:i,. 5 .!2..~!:".!..:5 a,.:t...L9..!J._ .. _id.C_~~§: . .t.1.2-"-.--D.Q...._D_g_r_m..S-'lL .... ~~-g_n o m.i..c: _ b t?.s: ~'~ .. -.. ?.D.fL!:ib ... Lt§. 
b"!.?..C_t ,..., ~r~::?.c!li. . .P .. _t; __ S\.!J._ .. J?_s._t:.r:L_L~Y.-\=.!.h.U:":" __ p +.. ___ t.!J.:..?...:;.L.J2..~l::-_:ti..;; .. Lg_S\.:t_tp n.. I I ( 56 ) 
a5 the above which make it ch·f+icult to talk 
~Problematically in "t:.t-?rms o+ b f:? t. v·J i:? E2 n 
~ite cao1~a1 and tne BlacK asp1ranT.. oourgeoisie. 
(56) African Business vol13 nolO 
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The ~t~uctu~e ana orac~1se of wh1te caoital 1s nignlv monopol1sed, 
f1nanc1ai muscle and technical resources of t~e 
sophisticated anc competitive Rand economy, and of the in~ernational 
financing world~ and can count on the co-operation of the bureaucracy 
and of the 
historically as an adjunct of capital). 
The aspirant clack bourgeoisie has no such muscle behind it. Its 
historical roots are in the informal sec to;·- and petty-commodity 
oroducinq stratum of the proletarianised masses. It has never had 
Kcess to the educational, financial or technical resources available 
to its white counterparts, anG in ·fact i~emains legislatively and de 
from access to these facilities. In the pt-esent 
political economy, it cannot compete on any level with white capital, 
6 the above quote makes clear. 
Wh i 1 f.? peri oc:s =·mini ·····boom=· ( E•:;J. :l978-8()) might witness wn1te 
capital rnaking largesse towards black business, these 
spate·::. o·f patronage do not encourage the self-determination of the 
hpirant bourgeoisie but (as the recipients themselves are well aware 
and resent) merely foster dependence. As the structural econDmic 
JrJhi te capital 
ma i n t a i n h i :=; -r:. u r-· :i. c: ;~ates o+ accumulation>, to penetrate the Black 
market, shouldering undercapital1sed Black businesses aside in the 
·-,.-·.\ 
l . .;... 
Althouqn NAFCOC leadersn1p claim that ~AFCOC was refuseo audience 
from 1967 unt1l 1976, the Government was accessible to tne Chamber's 
~preaches and requests from The main tenor o~ these 
depositions· centred on t~1E? t• __ n e t:Jermanenc·y- ur-ban 
Slacks a.r~cj discriminatorv legislation. While no 
official meetinq took olace in this period, the state did receive 
notific>.::iticm o·t· NAFCDC's concerns via delegations ot homeland 
1975 announced a number of concessions to 
urban Blo.:\c:k·:s. These concessions removed restrictions imoosed in 1963 
~d allowed Africans to own business prem1ses. 
commodities Africans could trade in was increased. vJhen finally 
oromulgated~ these regulations were however linked to the acquisition 
by the trader of a homeland citizenship certificate. 
As mentioned above, this requirement was dropped after mobilisation 
~ NAFCOC who gained support from big business. However the major 
factor prompting a government rethink was the intervention of the 
On 20 August 1976 the first NAFCOC delegation to see 
since 1968 was admitted to see the Deputy Minister of 
~ntu Admin1stration. The Deoutv Minister agreed to droo the homeland 
Citizenship requirement, to urge all Bantu Administration Boards to 
Consult 1.-'Jith ~-IAFCOC':s le>c:;..l ,::~nd ,~eg i onal chambet-s on all mattet~·s 
Ufecting black business interests, as v~e::. l as to meet with the 
~FCOC executive annually. 
More conces::;ions 
si zt:·:·! c)+ 
bUSiness activ1ties ooen ~u Afr1can caoita!. 
·-r·-:r 
i ._,;. 
However the feeling was still that the reforms had not gone far 
NAFCOC's requests 1n September inc l udecJ 
abo l i t i em of the BAAS's monopoly of the l1 q1 ... :.Dr- and hotel trade (a 
major source o~ + {'::\C i 1 i t.-::~.t i CJ!'I Cj·f 
industry and the revisiDn Df the discriminatory tax 
structure embodied in the Black Taxation Act. 
The major point of contention in the 1980-81 period was the unequal 
rompetition between Black and white business, manifested particularly 
in the controversy over the 49-51 scheme. Although government refused 
to come down on the side of NAFCOC, leaving the organisation to fight 
its own battle with monopoly capital (with some success - see above) 
the state did support the establishment of 
Development Corporation the 
predominantly frDm the private sector. The aims of the SBDC included: 
" ::+; the pr'-omot ion o+ pt- i va.te ente1~p1·- i se among 
all population groups in Southern Africa; * the financing of small business by providing 
share and loan capital on a short, medium and long-~erm 
fJ<3.·sis; 
* the underwriting of loans granted by the 
private banking sector to their own enterprising small-
bu·::;ine·::;s c1iE·nts" (57) 
While this was welcomed by NAFCDC. the organisat1on warned that 1f 
the African entreoeneur was to make any progress, 
~~;1 . ..:.!~\iey p 164 
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capita:, u~3uitable o~em1se3 and ou~eauc~a~1c restr1ct1ons should be 
execut1ve council 
the ~epeal o~ the ~and Tenure Acts of 
1 9 1 ::; ,;,u··: ,j 1736. Tne ?. ecut1ve wa3 also urged ~o resume negotiat1on on 
of CBDs through legislation 
pE?nn:i.ts inv·oi.'v'ing mur,icir;a.li.tif2S .:>.ncJ governmant agencies". 
(59) 
In 1983 the same themes were reoeated 1n more strident tones. In 
the F'i·-esi dent i .:3.1 Motsuenyane called fo1~ the 
immediate scrapping of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Group 
Area·s act expressed that government had ignored 
repeated calls for the opening up of the CBDs, and at the response of 
calls. i<oDr·nho·f had stated tha.i:: white 
institutions were allDwed into A+ i~i can area::; with the "·::;ole curoose 
needed facil1ties tc~ Such assi s::;tance by 
Afri c .. "-n s 1n white areas was not ,:tc c:: or-· din q to ..... • .. ne 
~inister. 
1984 saw NAFCOC taking u.p the i s·:5u.e o+ copulations removals, 
"not on J.·/ undemoC:i'"a.t i c and i nhum.:3.n, but also 
the greatest cause of community disruption, unrest and 
~FCOC conference executive to persuade the government 
t 0-~. -J., l L··.·! '.•• I ·,··.·.·.·, ·.·l. ~ .. ,·--·. ;,.·.· .. ,-.-. ·i-,_ ··.··.• ~, ,. 1 .• 1. r· ;:.o. 1. ·, ~, <:...··. ·.'o. 1_,, • J.. ; '· i- I"' ·r· . • I i (··, ·., - .. "1 ....... .• ..- ...:: • p~':i.l?"'···s o·,· , __ ,ie c:cJLln·_.i . .,.." ,.:_:;._.·; 
(C::9;' . R - 1 bid p 12'-' 
un thE.' 
D.•~F~i n in 1985. 
. ' 
G f:.":: 1T1 ~:;. r1 CJ :::. Government escalated 
Motsuenvane callec for the unconcitional release of Nelson Mandela 
and '"' ll pulitical prisoners. 
uf the ANC and PAC in 
order to initiate a peaceful dialogue with them and other relevent 
political organisations 
in the country. Calls were also made for the 
gaover-nment t.D 
* grant -full citizenship to all 
irrespecticve of their race; 
* scrap all discriminatory legidslation against black 
people including such laws as the Black Urban Areas Act, the GAA, the 
Land Acts of 1913 and 1936; the po~ulation Registration Act of 1950, 
* open all oublic schouls and tertiary institutiDns tu all 
rac:es 
* announce intent tD dismantle aoarthe1o 
* open business opoortunit1es for all races everywhere and 
abel ish scK i al and residential ( Pr·e-:;i c:ient i al 1::'jrJd1~es-:;, 
Mrican Bu-:;iness July 1985) 
Whi 1 e N(.:1FCOC. in a joint -:;tatement with the FCI, Assocom, Seifsa~ 
the Ai···i I and the Chamber of Mines expressec support for the reforms 
'·· i.J 'y' PW Gotha at tne beginning (J f 
~ot~ue·- ·..;,-.:j'.lP ~ . -1 I ... -·' ~H :sr::j CJ k (::? o+ je~ween rnetor1c and reality~ 
'' Al thouq J·-~ ·t i·i ;:::! C:io-../t::r·nm\·:?n t is; ·sp ea~': 1 n g a l an•;~ u.,:•.L:.if.? 
of reform nowadays, it is disheartening to observe the 
widening qap that ex1sts between the rhetoric of 
Government on the one hand~ and wnat hac~ens in reality at 
the bottom level of official~nm. 
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permea~es in~o che ~ower s~rata of aoministrat1on, where 
the oroblems actuallv occur. tnere can oe no JUStified 
chanqe of at~itude on the cart of Blacks resultino tram 
f.J r·· cJ ri ·~ 1 ·::~ .::~ ·:.~; 11"1 e:1. c:i e b '/ c:~ cJ \/ ~? r- n in.::::, ... ! t. l i·::? ~::\ d e r·· ·::; 11 ( t~-~ ·f ;·- i c ~\ r1 :::::i Lt ·:; i n e :::.. ·:s .J Ltl '/ 
l c?s:.::J) 
capture the essence t:.ht:-? l'"·e:t c.•.ti onshi p 
state. Commentators have co1nted to the high 
level of B1-:3.c:k lJu.si ness s~ate and caoital to 
believe 1s an assump~1on that is not borne ou.+..: J.n pi·-act:Lse. It 
negates the political independence and 
bourgeoisie, and underestimates the in 
pursu.i nq vmat. are admittedly class commentatCJr·s 
assume that the class interests Df the aspirant Black bCJurgeDisie can 
be real i ·o5E?d within the present fDrm Df state. They alsD identify the 
reasDns fDr the oursuance Df refCJrm by Black business Cthe furthering 
md strengthening of its class oositiDnl with the reasons of monDpDly 
the rate Df prDfit in the dDminant sectDrs of the 
KonCJmy while attempting tD stabilise the status quo). 
An accura~e view Df the periDd we have dealt with (rDughly the mid 
m's and the early 80's) would see ~he lukewarm support Df NAFCOC for 
'"h . ~oe1~eg1me re-purchased by the sta.te and capital 
throuc•h """il··- o· r· t <::" _11 '.:.:1 I <;t I .. _,) -:::t r1 cJ c cJ n c: E.··::::, s i on ·:::;. .. The Government has cDntinually had tD 
'leigh u.p in develcm1.ng i). "i;?;J.,::;.ci:: micc:iie c:J.,:-~.ss" against 
the market requiremen~s of wnich i~ the long 
run WDu.J. d by an incependent Black oou~geDisle. NAFCOC 
~JU.T. 
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:::> ·--~ '··- ; ' .:::+. ::::. titE·~ 1913 
commun1t1es 1~ is baseo in, to ~he 
c\nd the increasingly obvious lack of 
]. ["j V·Jh :i. t.e·····dCt!Tti n~.:1t..ed 
coverinq NAFCOC's July conterence. ( 6 i) While the re-adjustment of 
the organisation to the changing political conditions in the 
town~;t: ips and society as a ~hole had started with the resurgence of 
township ~~e.,.o1 t in ~984, many of tne conclusions and implications of 
the ''unr-·e~;t'' Dnlv coa.:LE~<.:;cecj fo1·- i"'JAFCCJC in :i.E•.tt-~ :!.9U5 .::tnd eE:i.rly 1986. 
At this stage the First State of Emergency had failed to crush the 
progressive movement; 1 n ·f .:•.ct in many spheres organ1sat1ons had 
mon2 n~si. l i ent a.nd ~~~i th a larger support base in 
the townsh:i.p<:-3. NAFCOC conference ( ~.Jr...t1 '··/ 5····· J. (J) 
imposition of tne Second State of Emergency on June 14. 
The contradictory ~os1tion of NA~COC was clear even from the 
attendance <':'.·:.:. while many delegates, especially from 
the Eastern Cape, could not attend since they were in detention or in 
killed in attacks on councillors' homes and 
h a.d b t=.:en in vigilante attacks on the 
,, 
comrades". 
of NAFCOC should best be seen at t~o levels: 
a.t o+ NAFCOC as a national 
~ganisation, w1th a centralised bureaucracv and links with caoital 
~d the state. The posi~ions that NArcoc (seen on this clanel ~ere to 
(---6 ------·--·--·-·-·--·---· 
1) FM Jul 18 1986 
formai organ:3ations, 
relat1ons witn ~he s~a~e, ~ne ind1V1dual attitudes of and influences 
~ leaders~iD of the organ1sa~1on. 
is NAFCOC at the local and regional level: the 
rganised voice of traders and petty accumulators in the townships. 
These operators were exposed on a day-to-day level to the ongoing, 
grinding polarisation of those communities; as their children debated 
~ether 1986 was going to be Casspirs 
rumbled through the streets and the houses of their neighbours were 
"Cc:ill a.\Jol~ '3.t ion". The direction these peoole turned 
depended on their perception of where their long-term interests lay: 
~ith the mass-based popular organisations or with further patronage 
In his Address to the 1986 NAFCOC conference, 
~tsuenyane reviewed the political developments of 85-86 and assessed 
~e contribution and position of NAFCOC. 
Review of period June 1985 - June 1986: 
A NAFCOC delegation, constituted after unorecedented consultation 
as the UDF, AZASM, Percy Qoooza and Bishop Tutu and 
senior NAFCOC members as well as Mrs Ellen Khuzwayo~ 
~arried out their mandate from the 1785 conference to meet with the 
~a0 ~ne Rubicon Soeecnl no~or1ous ror 1~s lac~ of ~ny 
concrete direction. 
NAFCOC hos~eo a National Conference on D~sinvestment earlv in 1986. 
attended by a range of '' •.• organisations~ 1ncluding 
tr-ade unions, ct.tl tural ~ political, c: :t vic .::o.nd pl'"·crf essi ona.l i:.1odi e·::;". 
This conference orompteo NAFCOC to review its long-standing policy of 
conditional investmen~, and broad consensus was reacheo on the need 
for black organisations to monitor and regulate foreign investment. 
(This posit. ion was reconsidered in the 
intensification of the international camp.::o.i gn !' .... ,_ne adoption o·f a 
total disinvestment position by many of the organisations at the 
initial conference, after strong critique of the Sullivan proposals 
had developed w1th1n NAFCOC, and after NAFCOC had spoken to the ANC -
see below) 
Not so well attendee 
by N{iFCOC in an attempt to shoulder its way into the national 
Politica.l .:::trena. However the conterence did expose NAFCOC to a range 
~ progressive ooinion, and the bas1s for Black unity that emerged 
was hardly reformist, in fact 1~ complemented other attemots at 
~dressing the education crisis~ re-iterated the call for the release 
~ Nelson Mandela and put on the agenda the need to evolve ''a socio-
~anomie policy that will ensure full participation by blacks without 
fund i'-1 "i.iP"··, t .=• ·· ·. · ... '"1. ""··== t· ·.- o· . ; i r· r·1 .. .al .••• I - ·-· J. J. "::' .... ~ --~ .• I : ..• \ ':: 
Perhaps the mos~ =~r ~:no 
:'85 was the unorecedented NAFCOC delegation to ~usaka to 
L2-i:Jerson NAFCOC delega~ion fl1t::?t 
;·,:;mi::lo lf·ihC) ••:-~ad mo·st of the memtJe;~s cJf the [;.~ecuti ve 
attendinq." T ·>· J. • ... that the the m<?.eting 
important op~ortunity to NAFSOC the political imoerative of 
"Unit;./ in {4c::t.i on li ~~i t~·t other organisations of ~he oppressed, and to 
over to the need for fundamental change. Issues discussed 
inc l ucied "the i·-ol e D f f::l c:\c: k bt.t.·5i nes:;s 
"Desirable economic the post-aoartheid the 
builclj.rH] o·F amongst the oopressed and the overcoming 
of ethnic differences, the imperative of co-operation between NAFCOC 
and other po:i.it:~c::-3.1 ,~~nci labour organisations, the ·f u.tL~~·-e cJ·f 
hamel and::;, c;+ 
Investmen·t: ·s ,~ .. "' a po:~?a.CE'+ 1 . .1.1 m•-::::,3.n·s o+ d i sma.nt 11 ng <:":l.Par-thei cl''. 
For NAFCOC a significant feature of the talks with the ANC was the 
access i b i 1 :i. t y o-f the ANC, their clear leadershio oualities and their 
NAFCOC's polic1es and activities. One o-f the 
~legation admitted qreat admiration for the ANC leadershiP~ 
"The m•=:et i ng recc: i. ·fi ed a. J. crt o+ incorrect 
perceptions i had of the ANC clue to lack of exposure - it 
~t-ia5 st: i~ i ~::·t n•:;J ···· we ,~e,::~.J. i. ·:;;ed the·:::;e a1~e oeop 1 E?, yo: . .J. :-::now, not 
bloodthirsty murrlerers - they are human. loving and 
·5en·:;i t. i \/E a T~-it??\j chef,.. j_ ·=·~i ··:= !·-es~cjofn a.·::. tnu.ch Cl.·=~ 1,1-~e dcJ il ( F'ei·-·:5onal 
I nt r::~1~ view -·· ~!J!•i ·?:: ... :1.. b7! 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------- _j 
Sever-al ot· zhe i986 coni~rence re~oiutions 
Tne most prominent deait witn the nat1onal 
d :i. ·:::; fn -:':3. n t l (·:·:~ ·::; 
~3 p ~-,. i-· t i-1 ;=:; :i. d , ,.-. eo r~ d. J. ·:::; -~:\ :i. l d :i. ·:::; c ,.- J. 1n i r·, . .: ... t C) r- · .. T... :i. a. v-.J ·:::; :f u. n b a. n ·::; 1"2 >~ i 1 e ·:5 
and all political orgbnisations unconDitionally, releases 
all pol~tical deta1nees and starts meaningful negot1ations 
with the ANC and all other political organisations in 
determining the future of this country, conference remains 
convinced that violence, instability and a oerpetual State 
of ErnE:·r-qt:>.riC:'"/ l.rJill r··E?ma:i.n the cl·-dE!I'". o+ the day.'' 
One dealt with the repeal of the Land Ac:t~ 
I! c::cwtf el·-·:::mc::e !~e·soJ. \leS that Unt i 1 the C3o·v·el~nment 
accepts the role of the black farmer and redresses the 
Land Ac:t of 1913, l1mited development will take place in a 
mc·~j C:Jt- ~-:;ec t. C) I'"" ·t: Cir j CJ!:J c 1.-· E~·=·~. +..: j_ on :a II n ;j 
Another dealt with the national Education crisis, another called on 
all "emp 1 O\/er-· organisations to secLtre the immediate release o+ all 
trade Uil i em "not to penalise detainees by maid ng 
that calling 
''on l\J12jFCCC to c a J. J. a st..tmtTt i ·t. meeting t CJ i·-· ev i ew 
present policy statements and views on~ i) disinvestment, 
ii) sanctions, iii) participation in any government-
created bodies~ viz: regiDnal councils, advisory bCJdies, 
statutory councils, 1v) existing relationships with 
Government related institutions, v) existing relationships 
with the private sector •• '' (see 4th NAFCOC Summit 
Conference belCJw) 
blow to the state's oroject of building a supportive 
Black middle class was struck with a terse call: 
'
1 on the (3CJ\tt=:J·-niner·,·~: to st.~~~)p fu.ti J.e .:1tt.~:inpt.s trJ 
,.-·,2-f oi~m -=~-iJ .·:\i-thei t~ by c:i"· f2a. t'. i r·,g co·::;t i. y i nef ·f ~=c t i ve mea. SUI'-es 
(sic) but rather to negotiate with acceptable leaders 1n 
ir· t:-? ~; t , .... U.C t. Ltl~- :t n g 0\Jr-· ·:3CtC: :i ~?t '/ 11 
------ --.... ·--·---·-....... --....... __ _ 
~2) see NAFCOC 1986 conference repDrt 
ann CJLi.n .:::: E~c:: NA~CUC woulc not 101n the 
Governman~'3 ora~osec 
rhetorlc cased as cower snar1ng and the 
f"IE:\ t .l Cin E:i. J. Motsuenyane ~old 
delegates that NAFCDC would not serve on 
"-:3.ny ac:l\,-i.sc:w·y bodit:.>s until NEd::;on i"landela and 
other poli~ic:al prisoners are released; the ANC and PAC 
unbanned; ana until government starts negotiating with 
cl--·edible Black leaders" (63) 
Reports in tne liberal press took t• . -_n 1 "'' blow, if not the 
death knell o+ the ·::;tate :• s at tempt to WDO II il1Dder-ates", wh i cr··, had been 
a ma ior justification in government rhetDric for the imposition of 
the June State of Emergency. 
4th NAFCOC ~"3ummLt. Con·ferer)_[:e 
This conterence, mandated as above, reached compromise positions on 
the controversial 1ssues before it. They are nevertheless interesting 
as examples of how far NAFCOC has been pushed politically, and to 
~at extent the organisation is still C: Clll C: e1.-· n e.j its 
independen~ class interests. 
While the Summit Conference decided nat to debate the merits and 
~-merits of sanctions, it resolved: 
"1. That i\~AFCOC will not t.::d-::•s pal~t in any f utLu--e 
efforts to encourage new investments in the country in all 
cases where Blacks are not meaningfully involved. 
"2. that NAFCDC will not campaign to oppose 
disinvestment oor sanctions directed against South Africa 
and the government in particular~ 
'':::. Tha.t thE~i·-·e is; !:3. c.:;;_:;;;:;? +cii.- ~5t-?:i.ectj_-...ie ec:onc;,Tiic 
pi·-·e~5su.I--e:· Llnless: 
-( ---·······-···--·--·-···-······-·--··--·-·-·········· 
63) FM Julv 18 1986 
unbanned 
3.1 All political orisoners are releasee, 
··~ Hll Blac~ political organ1sa~1ons are 
enters in~o d1aloque with 
credible Black leaders 
3.4 Government commits i~3elf to 01smantl1ng 
a.t::~<:~. ;·- ·U·i e i d " ( 6 4 i 
More controversial resolutions followed. specifically those dealing 
~th the manner in which NAFCOC and Black business was going to take 
advantac:Je of the "ge:<D" lt.""·Ft. by c:leoa.r-ting ·finns: 
"4. thc:1t l'~{:iF"COC establishes a ,.-eseai·-ch unit to 
look into the oossibilities of mobilising financial, 
technical and other resources to facilitate the 
indigenisaticn of those investments that become available 
as aresult of sanctions~ 
"5. The r·~t-""'tFCUC i"iana~~ement Commi t.tee look·::; i 11to 
the possibility of appointing a full-time co-ordinator to 
facilitate the implementation o~ the programme of 
'indigenisation'. 
We sh.::111 see later to what extent the take-over of departing firms 
agc.d nst progressive organisations. 
The second resolution that is important for our purposes deals with 
the question of participation in government structures. It seems that 
~e summit was unable to reach consensus on the question, and came up 
~th what 1s 1n fact a vaguely worded warning: 
"llJhen:~as ;··~f.~FCDC i~5 a ·iedei·-a.l m-gani5-:3.tion 
consisting of various autonomous regions operating in 
difficult circumstances and 
''whei·-t?as ti·le people W\;? sei·-v,? ·::;ee \::iovet~nment.--· 
created bodies and councils on the political and 
educational front as unacceptable. noe therefore~ this 4th 
summit of NAFCOC calls upon its members to exercise 
caution in associating with these unpopular structures~ 
wh i i. ·::, t nd e!'" c i:.::?J:..JJ.9 .. __ ~.-1J;.!S:;_~l_.Q.!JS.l. .. .9.!::l ..... J2.~~.~g __ q_[l_!. h EL. .. 9..~.2.t 
.i.l-iWl~~!I!.§i::~.:L...:.:J +_.~2.~.~~.L-... ~;.t;~r!.~it .. !-:..A.:.=!n~L ... <?.:.D.9_ .... :l:...:i::!-~_,;_g.II1.!:!1.L,.~.!J.i.:!; .. L ... .§..2_~ 
wh_gj_i?_!!...,~ 
-(64) --H·::;:·:-.1.· ·.1L ..... - •• ~:~·r·~. , ..:::-, '.·.·:':;· l-.l-l·n-,.,.-,., -.L· T •• --., .... ·:~ .• ·,·,~ '.-.. ·.l' 't, •• l • ..__ ',,·. ,·:·.·.,-, i ...... , .. . . .. .. ~- _ ~-~ ' _ ~ tram telex messaae aersonal!Y 
~trusted to PJLH 
C:J _;, D.nc::•:? an -~,;'i.ir.J-3.\' 
CJi"'CJans of 
cl U'"''~J··· ;nuc::n r:.nt:~ 
motivations beh1nd ~AFCOC's involvement in politics. Participation or 
non-particioation will not be decidea on nationally; businessmen mav 
e~·{ ei.- c 1 ·:;e a. ''lDc:a.l DPtiDn' CunfDrtunate term!) and decide whether or 
not tD participate on judqment CJ.f cDnci it ions'' :• th•:::! 
commu.n i t: y <.~.s a. V-Jhc>le=' .. This implies that if cDnditions ·- 'j 1 I'"'"\ • ' <::!.c•.UW l'C (i e. 
if the ci \li c 01~ l.he youth are not strong enouqh to oPpose ll.~ or if 
vigilantes/the security forces/Inkatha have by ·f Ol'"ce c•·-eated the 
space ·f 01~ local authorities) NAFCOC will not censure participation. 
~ the other hand~ in cases where popular organisations are hegemonic 
and command a ·follov-Jing~ NAFCOC would advise against participation. 
This inay be too cynica.J. ~ but I WDU.J. d argue C\ accurate 
interpretation of the conditions promoting this resolution. 
The conference continued the old NAFCOC theme of NAFCOC oe1ng the 
'medi C:\t.or- '' a.ncl 1 . ..1.n i t 'tl i::1 et itJeeri 
negotiations between the oppressed and the oppressor: 
~'Ji~ .. 2~21J:t.!::L9Ll .. _C.:'!.£.}._.f_Q"' c D •? I'" i~J:~i..9EL. ~"' :L:t. h id .. "t:.fU::" ,.-_..tLd: ... ,:0 c: i:::_ 
~f.~.~M.t ... £~.~-:::P. .. ~2.J .. j: ... t.l ... ~~:~~:.}.~·-···:~:.!.)~.t_ .. _g_r:.~:lJ~.~-§.:§ .. t.gr.:)A_t ....... ~2J:.g.:~JJ. .. :.~ s.~~t.J o D ~:; 
"This 4th 3U.iTiini T..: c:Dnft.~l~enc:e of i'·jAF'CUC 
acknD~ledqes tnat one of the mo:;:;t important objectives of 
NAFCOC is the establishmen~ of unity in a disunited 
countJ~y. 
"Th i '3 c cm·f er· en c: F: ·f UT t h ei·- ;~ t::c oq n i ~5es t. he n eec:i ·f 01~ 
NAF'COC to maintain an image that ~ill enable NAFCOC to act 
as an agent for Blac~ unity sa as to facilitate tne 
formulation oi a Black agenua 1n any negotiations that may 
ensue bet~een ~ne government and the oppre3seo people oF 
th:i. ::;, c:ountJ~y. 
~~o:----.rw:-------------------- ----
.I- ;.~ .••. -~-
·.n· f•:::\t.,, tnere is ongo1ng consu1ta~1on and co-ooeration 
p~ofess1onal organl3at1ons that are relevant ~o the 1arger 
1ssues fac1ng the Black ~eoole or Soutnern Africa. 
II i-·i i.J it-~ E? \/ '== r- ~ tTi i~ IT! b ~::2 ,.·- -~.:.. (j + (··-.i {-~ F' c:~ c; c: :; ;~·, C) i . ..i. J. c:i r- e f j·'N ~3. i n ·t= r- 0 ill 
perpetuating a situat1on 1n ~hlch oarty oolit1cs dilutes 
t:. h.-:.:= + ,r· et?.d c:>nl rJf f\~;~;.::·c:~JC; t. C) + (Ji·- fi1; ... l :i. at t? it·;; ~?c CJ!I cJrn i. c:: p (J 1 i c i e ·:5" '' 
What is clear here is NAFCOC's continued attempts to insert itself 
into nat i onc;..l to cJ.,3im a maJoi~ ;~oJ.e due to 'black' 
:i. t.: s:. to 11 b12tck 
subordinating itself any· pol j. t. i c:a:L 
jeopardising its profits. 
Leaving the 4th Summit~ we move on to an example of NAFCOC carrying 
out its intent i r.ms o·f bringing tog~=ther di ·ffen:nt political 
organ i ·::,at i ems. 
Hosted by the National Transvaal Regional Convention CNATRECO) a 
group i. n~J o··1· a1. 1 Tr· an ·s v,::J.a 1 ,~eq :i. on al c:t1amber-·s, the 11 cCJn\;en t. ion '1 b r-Dught 
together 500 delegates of di~ferent persuasions; tncJ.Ltdiilg 
AZASO anc:i schools organisations, NECC members Vusi Khanyile and Ms S 
1\~AFCOC 
membe;~:;;. ( 65) 
The keynote speaker, NATRECOC oresiden~ and NAFCOC vice-president 











own''. T~1s seems ~o sum ua ~,e mooc an~ ouroose ot tne get-together: 
• ... .'! 
lt spa1e 1s made for 
them 1n the DOst-aoartheid 3e~-up. 
The brouhaha about the funding for the advertisement on Thursday 
January 8 calling for the unbanning of the ANC served to suopress its 
most important oolitical feature~ the massive range of organisations 
supporting the call. While the advertisement was placed by the UDF~ 
NECC and SACC, it was supported by= COSATU, the 81 ac k S.3.sr1, the 
National Soccer League, the Health Workers• Association, the Call of 
Islam, the Release Mandela Committee, the South African National 
Students' Congress, the Ti~an·:svc:\,::;.1 Indian Congress, the Natal Indian 
Congress, the South African ~;;1 . ..:.gtly Union, art t. i ·-r-·:.c 
Committee, the Federation of Transvaal Women, the Democratic Lawyers 
Assci ati on. Taverners Association, and the 
Southern Transvaal Chamber of Commerce (80UTACOC). 
The Unban the ANC advert came after montns ot ga~ner1ng support for 
t~1e UDF, ~:!ACC -:3.nd 
COSATi...J, thi:'~ aim of V"mich wa·=.:; tc.J: "hn."JadP.n tr·1e i:JC\Sf.? o·f ,~esistanc:e anci 
draw into tne people's camp more and more of those elements forced by 
~eState of Emergency to take a definite politlcal stand against 
.•.. 
..... 
The fact of this c~ose co-operation coes not of course mean that 
SOUTACOC is aoout ~o trans~orm itself into a revolutionary mass-based 
organisation committed to building working-class leadershio, nor are 
they· a;:Jc:;ut to affiliate to the UDF. 1-·!owt.:\/Ei.- ~ •·· .l ··- indicates a 
willingness on the part imoortant sector of NAFCDC to align 
itself to the cemocratic movement and expose itself to attacks both 
from within NAFCOC and from the state. 
Asked a.!:Jout the contact. GO!.JTf'.)COC had with Black political 
organisations, SOUTACOC president Willie McBain-Charles refused to 
give much detail for security reasons, but stated: 
" We are e;.;oosed ·r..o pi~ogl~es;;:;i ve -fcll~ces ····· W•:? ar·e 
aligned to ~entiments of freedom •••• But there is no 
question of affiliation - we have a diverse membership and 
t;,le must ca.te;·- + o;·- their b\~oadei~ asp i ~~at ions a.s well". 
(Personal Interview 22.1.87) 
sources revealed that SOUTACOC had regularly met with 
pol it i c:a J. organisations and vouth l eacie;·-s;, and had contributed 
regularly to the financing of funerals and other mass gatherings. 
SOUT?iCOC ha•j mDreo·-~·er- es:,tabli5hed a ''f:3o~t.Jet.D F\e1ief r=-und'' fo;.- t.he 
families and deoendents of in·:: er ·-.' i ew ·-· iV!F\ 
16.1.87) 
What is alsD very clear is the amount of division even within 
Progressives within NAFCOC. McBain-Charles clearly had 
oresuma~ly more for its Black Consciousness histDry than 
al·:so had a 
diStinct Africanist aoproacn. Th1s would clearly lead to oroblems ano 
the ouestion arose of relating to Cnarterist forces in 
the U!Y:. 
As the campaign for national unity progresses~ Charterist forces 
win hegemony over the progressive movement as a whole and people"s 
powe1~ i. s:; t:Jt..ti 1 t. :i. t :i. s:; lik(?ly ,.- e 1 at i. C)n ·;:::, b E!t.v·.Jeen 
orga.n :i. ·:sat ion :s cJf such as NAFCOC and the 
movement will become closer and stronger. 
An e:-: p l i c i t secondary goal of the consumer boycott camoa1gn (apart 
from exerbating contradictions between state and sectors of its white 
constituency) was to bring a11 sectors of the townships ~oge~ner in a 
unified and disciplined campaign. 
As one consumer boycott organiser said~ 
'' t !-te boyc e<t t. br- in q·:s to•;Jt:~t her- trJDi'- i<i2i·-· ·::;, students~ 
church people~ businessmen and the rural communities into 
practical action against the government and its policies. 
1-or pt.lt~pl)3•:=·:; o+ immed:L<:~.tt-:? iilDi::Jilisation th:i.s fc1rm of unit'/ 
is crucial and we are committed tCJ maintain it. This class 
alliance, together with other forms of democratic 
struggle, must inevitably shake the gDvernment''. (67) 
representa~ives said clearly that one ot the aims of 
the boycott 111j. drJl e c1 ass~ 
----······-······-----···---···------·······-·-·-




• .• .J I t~om tne agendas of 
in 
consume~ ~oycott.s was ~es1t.ant and unenthusiastic. 
As Gaor1el Mokgoko~ NAFCOC public relations manager expressed it: 
"~>Je Sl . ..!.ppm-·t the it Fting o·f the state o·f 
emergency because we are conscious of what it does to us 
as businessmen and to our community. We can't stay aloof 
from calls against the state of emergency otherwise we are 
seen E:\ ·:::; p ~·::1.1'" 1:.: c)+ t h 1::? ·::; ···-/S:-t. E-?1T! ' 1 ( ,_sc;) 
The hesitance of the umbrella organisation and its leadership to 
come cH..J.t :tn full ·:;;uppoi~t of th•? bO"/COtt 1--i=:f J. ected the 
disparity between !\iAF=-coc memi:• e1·- s ~ espt:~cially in the 
been impJ.icatecl in vi<;Jilantt:'! o-~.t·t .. :acks on comi--a.des; 
whi 1 e i r, Inkatha/Kwazulu trader Inyanda 
C~c~tTimer··ce, cE.-\!ne out against the consumer boycott. Inyanda 
president anc:i oresident~ PG Gumede, I n··y.::..nda 
members for meeting w1tn The boycott committee~ 
"P1t a time \A)riE"~n I c;.m busy appeal. i ng "t.:o the white 
private sector to assist in the rehabilitation of black 
ous1nesses, I cannot on the other hand be seen to be 
actions of Fosatu, 
. . .. 
.J'~1 n trletTtlf 
i. n ;;:..ci voc E~.t ;. n•;.J thE.~ con sumE?I·- bc·y'cot t '' • (Fin .:an cia 1 i"la. i l 
1:::.8. i37) 
However· 1 n o.t. l E~a~~;t support the boycott, 
prices or staying open longer, if they did not become 
integ~ally involved o~qan i ~:;o: •. i::. ion o·t 
(1986: 7) - !.~ MM '. .. I Jl.:.:" ,. lt.J.illp t:?i .. ,····c a.o it .;~i.1 i :st. s 11 in 
---·-··-··-··--·-·-·--·-·-···--·-·----
(68) .t::):L c: t:j["j. C:l t. 
(69) Ibicj iJI.i 
bourgeo~s:e ~~ a whole M3S bee~ ~ulled into tne national democratic 
In Port Elizabeth the strength of the multi-class alliance in the 
township3 gave the Port Eliza~etn Black Civic Organisation CPEBCO) a 
mass l:Ja.se in all 1 •..1.nder· ; +·-.1. '··· ::.~ 'juJ~t·:::;ciic:t.ion''. a.c:a.demi c 
close to the organisation descri~ed it as resting on an alliance of: 
''the l uinDen (::?1 E·ment in the ,:\m<.:\bl ... t·t.i"""ii::J, "C. he mi dd 1 r=.~ 
c.L a.s~:;, the Di'-qani sed WDI~ki r.g·--cl a~:;s, wDmen and scJu.attei~·s'' 
(Personal Interview MS 19. 1.87) 
representatives Df the Dept 
Cons·ti t.ut i anal Development about the possible upqrading of 
of 
the 
African townships, the NAFCOC affiliate, the Port Elizabeth Chamber 
of Commer·ce <PECOC) attended with PEBCO in a joint delegation. 
Observers remarked that when economic issues were raised, PEBCO 
hand eel O\/f=:!I~ to PECOC, who continued the negotiations. It is c::l ear 
that in this area NAFCOC members perceive their long-term interests 
as lying with the popular organisations and their programme of 
national liberation. 
R~nts boycotts are in force in 54 townships countrywide, in some 
areas with no residents paying rent s1nce September 1984. The Soweto 
town co:...:.nc:i :. losing R6 million per .... \_n(~ 
------··"·-----"----···-···--····-·-·--·-·-------
(70) F":Lna.llci . .::,:L i"ia.l1 t•.=:;.,i::l .. Ub 
boycott ..... ••4, -- ., ••• , ,.. ..... ... · .... ' ... ] .. i' ... !.I!' .. ,, 
month. 
Tr-ader-s; .:::;.nci Afr-Ican oourqeo1s1e 
dir-ect shor-t-ter-m class inter-ests in p,::u-t i c i pat i nq in the ,~ents 
boycotts. Indirectly they may gain fr-om the fact that their- customer-s 
have consider-ably more to soend each month. However obser-ver-s say the 
~cess 1s mostly going into consumer durables, bought at white shops~ 
It is clear that many of the asoirant bourgeoisie ar-e oar-ticipating 
in the r-ents boycott, as well as the street committees that bur-geoned 
in their wake. This is due not only to the fact tnat they do not want 
seer-1 not to be interested in community proolems and mistaken 
for a sellout'' (Pearl Luthuli, editor of True Love FM 12.12.86), 1e. 
over-t corrHnu.ri i "t:. y the of the 
community or-ganisations .L. -·· : ... 1....1 c: c1n + t··· c::nt :L:-:;su.es 
common conc;::;,·;~n ·fa.ct the of 
alternative power- structur-es ~o those of the state. 
The mannE?I~ the state has r-esoonded d;~awn on the 
lessons of f i ,-·st. Emel'" ·~J •'2n c v ~ vo.~hic::h 
repression quite obviously broadened the base of suppor-t of community 
organisations and the or-ogressive movement as a whole. The appr-oach 
h.vo;_,tn~d i. n 
strat£,.qy" c!~::=---·oc:).i it. i. c t st? 
COndit i Orl3 J. n the townships bv uograd1ng Afr1can areas, to engage in 
a "h ea1~ t ::; ,:~.~-·~ ci m i ; .. ·~ cj ~; '' ideological camoaiqn, and to destroy the unity 
~ those communities t. h ,~ ou.g i1 a.nd vigilante action. A 
( 7 L 
·;:; h I~ i.J l Ci .:Ji''" :,.>Je L 1 ·-off 
households. Second, em~lovers snould ap o ;·- oac:-1ed n<":l.mes of 
the possibility ~f deducting ·::-; t. tJP ·····CJI,.. C~ etr-
wage~:;. Th i ~-d, residents should they 
should pay rent. This 'persuasion' could take place througn the press 
and p -:'3.f!ip it 1 E•t 
.I..' ' 
~- il i.- CJU.(] n counc ill or·5 ( :_r.;j_ th "SAF' 
their constituents. or through contact with the youth 
at • weekend they ..-~oul d of the 
paying t~ent ( 11 + o;~ the up l if +:.ment o·f ·5o;.:i o·--econDmi c c i r·cu.m5i::.ance·=.:;) . 
This multi-strategy intervention would be accomoanied by attempts 
up a.l tF:?I~n<:t·ti ve ''authot-l·t:.·y· st.,~uctu.i~t.=:·::.;'' fo;~ the '' en·fDr-c:ement of 
discipline within the J.n the 
townships, as an attempt to cDmbat the hegemony of ~ne civ1c:s' street 
'la•-..J and order committees' the 
decisions of the structures. 
.;. .. ···~ 
'·- ~ •• J 
C 1-~3.SS Cl ec"H-1 y th :i. ·::; 
lines a.nd to re-establish a netwo;~k cH..:.tside the 
Progressive movement . involve the co-oot1on of elements 
.j ....... .,_.__J 
no 
(Whic::h CCJI..J.ld 
0perat·.t::'d -:·3. 1r· CJ i ... t rJ Ci 
i •• ;._ -· .t31.::\ck : .. ; :r::: 
of the late 70's. 
While the collaose of occurred largely due to the 
the insurrectionary cl1mate and the growth and deepening of 
contr1butory factor was the 
collap-se· o+ local authoritie-s due to the lack of a fiscal base. The 
introduc t. i ori CJ·f :i.-::~; ~ .. li!Tied 
redistributing re-sources authorities to the 
provide the necessary 
local authorities and their accompanying oatronage 
networks in the townshios. 
We have forced into a more confrontationist ap~roach 
vis-a-vis the sta~e on t~~~CJ le .... /e:Ls: 
orqan i ~5a.t ion (J•t in the thick of the 
intensifying civil o-f the 
1 i kel i ht"Jod of i dent :i. ·f :i. ed above continuing must 
necessarily be conjecture. 
At this; ~·Je can do is identify the fac~ors which on the 
one hand would urge greater identification with the goals of the 
democratic movement co-operation witn 
organisations. and C)t. h f..? I.- na.r1CJ thOSE~ which would hinder 
radicalisat1o0 ana oro~o~e ClV1Slan. 
Factors promoting un1ty at tne oporessed: 
Undoubtedly the greatest sour tcJ .C:\ disciplined unity under the 
}eader·:sh i o o+ t.he WCii~king the orDwth and strengthening of 
organisations of disciplined relationship to the 
democratic movement, and the development of structures of democratic 
It i::; when ::;uch structures are able to 
h E'';i E?iTICJn ''y' c ommu.n it·-.; 
bourgeoi ·::;i e can be pulled into a disciplined national-democratic 
alliance. Until then the interests of the aspirant bourgeoisie~ while 
in contradiction with state and white capital~ w1ll oush it along an 
"indep;:2nc:ent'' and \fC:•.cillating col..J.i~::;e, t.l.n~'.lilJ.in•;J to suboi·-dinate :i.tsel·f 
to any discipline or to expose itself. 
o·f this national unity (national nere usee 1n 
sen:ses: th.::•.t of •country-~ide" and thc\t of "the AFrican nation-in-
becomi n>:::J • depends on being c •:Jn tin L.ti2c:i by 
revolutionary organisations, tha.t a.i: all times they are prepared to 
broaden thE' tho::;e un:i.tt:.~d 
regime and its supporters, in order to weaken and isolate the latter. 
Thus the UDF. in an asse::;sment of the strategic imperatives of the 
''.Tc.J d(-?f ·~·:)r·tG ,::,J.J.rM ~_J,-3.1 n·:::; ,·::r.nd ta.i<e f C:)r··~,..;a.(·ci CJLti·- ·t= i qht 
for freedom, we need to deepen organisations where they 
exist, estaolish org0nisations where they do not, and 
build greater unity ~etween all forces ooposed to 
ap E1r·· t h r::~:i. c:i m :i. r1or :i. t. ")/ ,~ '-'· -~ E~ .. ;' 
----···----·---------
... ··:·-··1 ... 
... i . .::. l 
(72) UDF Update val 2 no 3 November 1986 
¢ctar1an s~rategy that ignores 
l . t . -·· "'·; pO 1 .1 t ... ·"··'· 
. .. 
r·i ~·::\. T. 1 CJ n -::·:·1. J. in 
that thev w1ll be 
~livering u~ allies and supoorters to the regime w1tnout a fight. 
An i mpcr··•:: .. ::•.nt factor related to the above is that of mass community 
need not be linked to organisation. Thus the mere fact 
wor-k i nq and u.net11p 1 oyed me<:;.n:~ in a direct sense they 
must br::.: sensitive to the sentiments of the township 
residents. not!' continue to 
~grandisement at the obvious their customers~ they are 
immediately l1able to overt duress, be it 1n ~ne form of an informal 
boycott cw violent attacks. At the 1985 annual conference NAFCOC set 
up a ''Cc;mmi::;:::;j.on o.f enc~u.iJ·- .... ,; into the de::;tr-u.c·tion cJ·f bl.:;..ck busine:sses 
dur-ing the unrest'', the preliminary findings of which were circulated 
confidentially before the 1986 conference. and were, observers say, 
an important pressure on NAFCDC to align . . " .. ]. ·c ·:::.e.i. w~· more closely with the 
"proqi'"E~5·:::;i ve ·forces". 
The pressure exerteo on the aspirant bourgeoisie, and the growing 
to fundamental change is greatly facilitated 
by the degree of access the masses have to the asoirants; both groups 
live 1n the same geographical areas~ use the ::;arne facilities and live 
th(·Z: same candi~ions. In these cond1tion::;~ a. (j·f 
Primitive apartheio~ to 
I, 
H 
tact iS recogni~ed ~v 
ital: 
n1ghly-~~illea workers and vaur 8anager1a1 L~a~~ wi~h tne 
lowest level of labo~rer? io use ~ar~ls~ or ~NL terms, ao 
·y· C1 U. r.J 1...\ 1: t h 2 k:5 ;::,'..1. !..- q .:~C) J. :::; · ·· ~~~ _;_ 1 t ~2 i. n t. rl (·?. -:;:; E:·,_ Cil F0 i·:. C) lr~ n -:·J. 3 '/ CJ Lt 11-
p r·· C) 1 e -t: .. ::•.1'- 1 .::·:!. r1 .:::\ ~ .. - in .... / ·;·~ ! ' ( C:j i :L 1 1 (J Hi F::· e 1 ::._? t3 :L : .~; ~3 ) 
A major- impatience at an organisational 
lack Df by ~AFCOC members 1n the 
~ite-dominated economy, both as tr-aders in comoetition with white 
pr-ofessionals in the monopoly 
the first case, this 1s due mainly to tne incompatibility 
of the interests of white monopoly cao1tal and those of the aspir-ant 
Afr-i c:a.n c CJirtiTit.?!.- c :L ~3. j_ The -· J •• ciL 
devel opmE~nt nf 11 CCJ11tpet.i t~i \/e cc:·~pi t-:::\1 1; state pr-otect1on anc 
guar-anteed markets :d it is to make pr-ogress. Neither ar-e likely to 
be forthcoming in the current economic climate. 
f In t:-,~=:? ::;econcj c-:J.sr;· ~· dE·Si::l i te the ;·-heto;·-· j_ c: ,3\:)0U.t '' a·-f ·-f :. !".irli:".'.t :i. ve action 
1n white nands and is likely to do 
so fo;~ futur-e. Mor-e than 90% of management in South 
Africa i ::; white·-· 
I 
.::\ c.:; 1··· o : ..1. p i n ':;) that makes uo less than 15% of the 
population. Whites expect senior positions and lucrative remuneration 
to remain their preserve. and seem to he fighting a rear-guard action 
against attempts by senior m.:,~.n <3-CJ em en t and hi ar: k pr-ofessionals to 
cha.nq~=:? t.hi=.tt:. We have referred above to the speech made by Bar-lows' 
of South to the neeJ for businessmen to 
r---------------------------------- -~- ---
whites ~old a monoooly ot economic power, ana tnat oas1c structure is 
avernlon~. As Bobby Godsell, 
"whizz-~ld'', put it to the ~eng Range Planning Association: 
II a • IIi ndt.J.·:::;t;····\ .... i !l ~)c.Ju.t.h ?-)·{ i,.. i c:~:':i. t ::; t;'iE·! j C)i ;-·lt. 
effort of caoital, that is, in part White, in part 
foreign, and Black labour. For a long period of time now 
1ndustry is going to have a particular capital structure 
that is not going to change. We are 00~ going ~a see ~n 
the next five years a Black Harry Oppenheimer or Wim de 
!...) i 11 i E·r- ~:;. " .. il '·· / -~:·} 
The fact CJf th(;; impossibility of the accomodation of the aspirant 
African bourgeoisie as a class into the structure of South African 
monopo:l y· -- ....... ,; .t.. - "! t •.. .c:l.j..J.i. i., • .;::l . .L :LS a ·5pu.r to that to ·seek 
fundamental change. 
This attitude was expressed consistently in interviews with uo-and-
leadership. People reacted angrily to mention of such 
as the SBDC or the ~rban Foundation, which ''still have a patronising 
attitude". 
say that what they are doing is in the country's best 
interests ..... they don't consult, they seem to be 
thinking 'we know better than you' - they don't get our 
general support ... they are patronising and paternalist ... 
they speak to the [Franklin] Banns of t~is world who claim 
t () k n CiW lf·~h -::~. t". lrJE~ Ci.i .. - €-? -:it] .:Ju. t : il ( F'f.?I·- ~3(Jrl a.~ In t Ei·- \/ i E!rJ •••w wi·~: 
22.1 .. 87) 
Similarly the initiative ~o open the Central Business Districts has 
Been seen as 'too little too late': 
----·---··-·--·--·-···-··-·--·---·--
(73) in panel discussion a~ Long Ranoe Plann1nq Society of Southern 
A·f ,.- i c: a C;ec on J An:-·, •.J.:<.l C::or-~ F ;;:;; i-- er-·! c: .:·?:.' ~ l 7th i'"ia.r· c:: h :l 981 
~here were no oartl23. 8ut its 
tyo1cal tnev say ~n U3 ;ou may ~raae \n ~own, out you 
C<'0.:")1JC:;t. :i.l.\/2 lr'l 7.C}I,i·Jrl:o!! (Jl:Ji.d.) 
Uf!der·::;ta.ncJ 1 IICJ ,-,,i.: • •• .J I the mot1vations oenino o~en1ng up :._,. J::.~ L.J ·;::~ ~ 
the flio-sioe Justificat:on tor the oe~etration bv white capi~al 
of the 'the white mar~ets are saturated - they seek 
add i ~::. i cnal L~n t ·::":\P p t:·?d i.n the D1D.C:k anc! '-.I. sec: 
~regulation as an excuse to move in'. 
of deregulation, hailed as 'the beginning of a new 
era • by state and capital~ seriously mars the chances of the opening 
~ CBDs in any way moderating the pressure from NAFCOC for chanae. 1~ 
anythiror;] .; ~ .L '- an intensification CJ·t-= demands 
change. 
The major force attempting to disruo~ the unity of the oopressed is 
the state -..-=:\nc~ its st1·-c~.teqies cJ-f !'di ... ;ide .3nd r··u.le'':r FcJI.- ti-·ie ·:5i:1 .... ategy 
of wi nn i rt(_::j over a black middle class supportive of the status quo 
the next two years w111 oe decisive. 
At one level it is crucial for the state's urbanisation policy that 
the state through the JMCs and their surrogate forces win the battle 
over the rents boycotts. The 'orderly urbanisation' oolicy hides the 
intention o+ c!i \l:i. d1 ng the 
strata, t.cJ 
near the oantustans, while a programme 
in:t cc r. ~~ ·-c 1 a=:;s 
~1ac: k 
reduction (:J·F state subsidy for hou5ing, tnus graoually squeezing out 
Obviously ~ne rents boycot~s ~ose a maJor tnreat to this plan, and 
this would aod extra urgency to initiatives of the JMCs ~o break ~ne 
boycotts. At this s~age rents boycotts are ~ak1ng off nationally, and 
in their- committees are deeDening and strengthening the 
hold organisations over town·::;hip·::;. It seems 
unl i kel'l th;:1.t can be broken without the application of 
force on the scale of genoc1de, but conditions are not static. These 
factor·::; p :L €:.c::e extra responsibility on the movement to 
extend and broaden the oase of the community organisations. 
state is deoending on the ability of the combination 
and co-ootion t~rough the JMCs and other interventions 
for the resuscitation of local autnorities and 
their accompany1ng patronage network. The Regional Services Councils 
Authorities 1n several ways: 
* they redistribute substantial resources from the white 
local authorities to the1r blac~ counterparts, 
(74) report 1n WM 3.10.86 
* 
of ~ne sta~e r~om ~he 
ds, dn(J 
':''{I 
(Cobbett a~ ai 1985: 11) 
about che dEo~ee of success 
1Ti () :3 t (j -::~. fTI !i :i. n q ;: ei:;..tun:: i ·:s the 
o·f C:\LJ. t h Of~ i t. i E?-':5 and thE! (J+ 
resistance to them. It v.Ji i i., in t.he c:cJnte~{t levels of 
Fliticisation, oe nit;.l!'l inipc.1s·::;it.11E? membe~s to s1t 
reconstituted local CJ;·- tC) g1··ve 
-...;en eel~ of 
still ext~emely undemoc~atic, and by no 
1eans a replacement +or political power. Moreover the economic crisis 
currently +a.cing ·the st:.,.=ttf.2 and divisions within the 
state and ;... • ·~ 1 . .... ne , u .• 1 ng b 1 oc 0\/el~ the optimum method to redistribute to 
the to~'>!ns;hip·:s, both legitimatory ano 
redistributive functions of the Regional Services Councils. 
The conse~vative tendencies identified in "C. he l'·-..it2jFCOC 1 eacier·::;n i p 
be a~ound for a tew mo~e years, and will thus continue 
to pi' .. omutF~ C E:\Li. t j_ CJn in the organisation's activities. 
posj.tion o·f di-f·fic:ult to 
tTt C) i~ E· :L rn p ~·:;.. t. :i. e r1 t leaders r1s1ng through the 
ranks of the NAFCOC bureaucracy. 
Motsuenyane 1s due to ;.-etii--e :Ln the next five years, and the man 
~eplace h1m as NAFCOC pres1oen~ is NAFCOC deputy president 
Nxumalo. ~xumalo was central i':.C} tht"2 
~he 'Peoole's Economic Convention• lrl Novem~e~ 1986 and 
.;. ! ; Cncs Maouza's invancza movement, 
n .; .-- "'.;_ .; ·or' -, t .. or g a ·' ::> <" '·- .i, '.. I ' \ .. ! tne Black Ali1ance of 
~rked closelv w1th the uoc 1n tne ~aNgwane nomeland and the Eas~ern 
franS'·/aa.L. the 
unambiguously 1nto the ceoole's camp. 
However certain divisive ~endencies are likely to remain. I have 
already mentioned the antagonism of several leadership people to the 
Charter and Charterist organisations. This is a challenge to the 
latter forces to win over NAFCOC as ~ whole to accept the leadershio 
of the democratic movement and Charterist forces within that 
movement. 
The pott.::?nti~:il at the 1 ~:~ve:L of 
accumulation. Although the vast majority of NAFCOC members are 
sensitive and vulnerable to commun1ty oressure, avenues still remain 
that are immune to mass pressure, being out of sight of the masses 
and independent of the tonshio mass consumer economy. 
A prime example of su.ci·1 1 ' + t-t:.~e~AJa'-.;s to ac:cumul ;:-..t i orl 11 is that l-:>f tr1e 
construction industry, previously dominated by white developers. The 
latter are unable to send white construction firms into the townships 
and have sought out black construction companies to do 
It has not been coincidental ~hat the majority of those 
black construction firms that have been involved have been close to 
the community councils, often tne first to hear of the contracts. 
I ntt.·~·r·-...;i t::v..J ····· fT! '···· I !• ..•• • 
'···•··= !:lo·:::;:;i.::Jl:li.t:",l oi" tt;e J~esusc:Ltat.ion of 
patronage networ~s has been the or1vatisat1on oi" l i Cil...t(Jf" 
trade. before sheoeen-owners the 
patron<i.•:::JE:· ·:.~. [) l:iv 
ro1e 1n promo~ing anti-social oenaviour. 
With the s:;a.::.e of the Administration Boards' beer-hails and 
hotels has arisen a potent opportunity for accumulation in the hands 
of thE! aspirant petty-bourgeoisie. ·rhe v·al ue o+ 
the majority of which is sold bv the development 
boards, was R694m 1n 1983~ while Blacks consume 56% ot the commercial 
malt be(eo~ sold in South ?-~·flr·ica. (75) 
Not surprisingly, the majority of liquor licences went to the 
councillors and their friends and legal bottle stores have been 
incredibly lucrative for their owners~ but often the first targets of 
'unrest' • 
Another example of a 
by black business~ some closely connected to NAFCOC, to buy up the 
stock and capital of divesting companies. The company initiating the 
c:amp;:..i gn , Black Equity Participation, consist ·s o-F Goweto Civic 
fi gureneao Dr· Bantu Councillor Richard 
lnkatha member Gibson Thula. motivation 
seems to have resonance with the position of many NAFCOC members: 
While it appreciates the efforts by the state and private enterprise 
in assisting small black businesses, 
( 75) sr.~e Si::.r- ·,.,-dom ~ . .T F:- ~ "F'!~ i va.t i s.:;~.t ion ;:..n d the sor· (~hum bt:~el~ i nd u.s try" ; 
MBA Wits 1'785 
J ThLlS 
''the penetra.ti nq qLtest.l Dr·, mu.s-c. tje .::~·:::;c::ec:: '·-'~;-·,et:-,f.?l~ 
blac~s are to ce assi~ned +or2ver to tne ro~e of small 
entreoeneurs - while m1ddle and major industry rema1ns 1n 
BET· ~~i i . .i. also be at~emot1ng to (Jn 
such major companies as Anglo Amer1can and Sanlam in order to attempt 
to influence the direction of these comoan1es. 
The objective of ''u.n<:;.shamed:L y i::Ju.·::.;i nf?Ss'', but the 
•otivation is projected as the need to whittle away white control of 
the economy: 
"the ccHTHni tment .and di~ i vi nq + or-ce woui d be to 
allow as many blacks as possible to shar-e in a wide range 
of inves;t.ment<:;;." 
BEP's plans have been roundly criticised by both 
ANC. Said a COSATU spokesperson: 
11 The bL•.,yot.lt p 1 an c1oe:.::. noth :i ng tcJ sol \,..e the 
problems of the country, nor does it address the poverty, 
unemployment and low wages suffered by the majority. 
"(ill it does :i.·s ctU.ow a +e~t-J individuals to make 
capital cut of that suffering and out of the struggle to 
E·nd apa.!·-ti-lt':? j_ d c..nd e;.; p l oi ta.t i em. n (Ibid. ) 
The connection o+ the BEP clan with imperialist designs on South 
Africa is less obvious but definite; the BEP's bankers are the 
Afr-ican Bank and US giant Citibank, while the plan ties in neatly 
to building 
bl a.ck tlusi ne:.:;·s. 
In 1983 USAID announced it would provide R3,5m over four years to 
train black ousinessmen, and for tnis purpose it signed an agreement 
with NAFCOC in September o+ that year. Said a party to the agreemen~: 
11 't.ht:: ~:.~.id i::;. i:\ ;;-.J.:.-t'y' C){ ;;~,E~.'~/i.ng th~:\t C:CJnS"I:.:!.-U.c:t:i.\/f:? 
engagement is not only aimed at Pretoria~ but that blacks 
C -:3.n i:) ~:·?r1 (·:::, f "i_ 'f: 1:.: C1CJ .• !! ( ~::·r~·; j'··~C~\i .:l 1 98::)) 
•• the p t::"?!n ei:.ir- -:3. t. in q c~ 1...1.es t i c'n i·nt.l st. be ·:·::t·:::; i<t::.·(] 1 .• '\lh i~t i-!f-.?1.-
blac~s a~e to De assi~ned forever to tne role of small 
entrepeneur3 - wh1le middle and maior industry rema1ns 1n 
t n E~ ;-·f ·:3. n d s:. C) f V·J r .. 1 :;. t:. ;;:-? -~:; ,. j : ( \;.~ E~ (:·:·~ 1-:: :~ \/ f"'! i:':\ i J. l:.i .. 2 ~~ f:3 ~7 ) 
BEP wi~l also be at~empt1ng to increase black noldings on 
influence the direction of these companies. 
The objective of the :tJEF' :i. ·:::.; ''unashamed :L y bu.·::.;i nf:·::.;::.;'', but the 
\ t. t . . 10 1va·-1cm 1~:; projected as the need to whittle away white control of 
the economy: 
"the commitment and di"·ivinq fcwce I.AJou:td be to 
allow as many blacks as possible to share in a wide range 
of i nvest.ments;." 
BEP's plans have been roundly criticised by both COSATU and the 
ANC. Said a COSATU spokesperson: 
"The buyout plan does nothing to solve the 
problems of the country, nor does it address the poverty, 
unemployment and low wages suffered by the majority. 
"r:ill it does is .:•.l1Dw .:•. fe!r~ individual·::; to make 
capital out of that suffering and out Df the struggle to 
E·nd ap,::u·-t.:-·~eid s.nd e;.;ploita.tion." (Ibid.) 
The connection of the BEP olan with imoerialist designs on South 
Africa is less obv1ous but definite; the BEP~s bankers are the 
African Bank I !C:: ·-'·-l giant C:Lt:lba.nk, while ti·1e plan ties in neatly 
bla.ck bu.sinE-~·:-;·::;. 
In 1983 USAID announced it would provide R3,5m Dver four years to 
train black businessmen, and for tnis puroose it signed an agreement 
With NAFCOC in September of that year. Said a party to the agreemen~: 
! i 'C. h E.~ ~·~-\ i d l ::;. a. ;rJ C:i. y~ C:) -f ::~~ C:\ ';/ i n g t h ~::'. t C: 0 ll ·::;. ·t. tr· LJ C t :i. \/ e 
engagement is not only aimed at Pretoria, but that blacks 
c::.:::..n i::~~·2nF::f :i. t tc)CJ .• '' ( F~·l'..-: i···~C)V ll- 198:::;.) 
.~nounceu a comp~ehensi~e p!an to stimulate tne olac~ crivate sector, 
' ' I,'~ 
;:, i .. .l. -:::; l n i2 ·::::. ~==· 
} Kelly linked the p~ogramme ~o the aues~1on of disinvestment~ 
11 I !Nl :i. :L tl·-·y·· t1.J c:cjn-...;i nee ti-tf.? t_:t) co!rtiTi(:?t-c:L .s.l s.;(:Ct(JI,... 
that this type at assistance will do mare to nelo South 
{::·ft.-ican b1-:::\Ci<·s T..f1an d:L·::;in\;,~:~·:stlnr:?nt cCt.iT!pai,;Jr·~s. '' (f:-i"'"'i 7.2.87) 
In March of that year signatories of the Sullivan Code (called Task 
Group 7) met with black businessmen to discuss their 
A steering f r·om both groups has been se·t up 
o·f i l'i'v'Ol vement for American business. The maJor a~eas 
were: finance, training, and commerce oetween the two. 
The BEF' is .::\ contj. nu.<3.i.:i on o+ t' .. ne concern of 
imperial i s;t c omp a.n i e~::; to deve:i.o!J o·f Black 
bourgeoisie. when ·finaJ.}.y pul:Led out in Seotember 
1986, it announced a olan to se1J. it~s ill Afnal·~a.:Tid.t.ecj 
Beverage Industries to 'unnamed iJ l a.c k businessmen' .Said 
Donald R Keough, President of Coke, 
'' ••• the decision tD wi t.r .. tdi·-.=.:'\:tJ ~;hou.l ci be seen as; a 
statement of this company's opposition to apartheid and 
our support for the ec:Dnomic aspiratiDns of Black South 
?H ,~ i c:an·:s. " 
''Our otJ..:ir::~ct i::; nclt. s;,ole:Ly to ,jisinve·:::;t. l!-Je V"·Jill 
d :i. si n ... ;e·::;t in a way th<J.t. c;rei:71.tes si qn i + i c::a.nt. mt...tl t.tr:a£..L& 
§.f-·El.L!:...i.~_l~.'-'l!:.t .. .t.~ .. tP.~ll .. tidD. i n the Sou. t :·, ~~~ + r· i. c: an 5o f t - d r i n k 
j_n,ju.st;ry." (Busj.ne~:;~-:; Time·::; 21.9 .. )]6 ..... mv emphasis) 
Thus there are numerous avenues for significant accumulation in the 
present oolitical climate, whereby the aspirant black bourgeoisie is 
abl t:? to establish itself indeoendent of the ~Dwnship ecollomy and 1n 
continued 
ob s t a. c :L E' '"; i 1··· -::J rn 1 ~, .. ,, _,. •. . ,,1_ .... 1··:: • 
' 
..l, ••••• 
'·- l...i :ne aspirant oourgeois1e as a 
whole, ;::~.nc sc i il 
le +· -~·~ .. l ··;·'-pro . __ <~I • c.~--, T..O 
accumul2~.i::. ion" is; h.:;._;····c:: :i."y" d threat. However vigilance must be ensured 
that the pot.(~~nt i <:il o·f to thern-::5el \/es i ntcJ <:t 
counter-revolutionary force is not redlised. 
One 1 c::tst mu.st. J. cok -:3.t:. i :::; t. hE~. t. (:]+ !! f-=•i,... i 'v' at t: ~:3ec t CJi·-
Coun c: i l On initiative of the Urban Foundation. The 
full list of members and constituent committees is aopended CAopendix 
2). What 
sectoJ·-s c:-,·f and figurehead leadership allied to the 
democratic movement. Monopoly capital 1s clearly attempting to ensure 
itself a role 1n a future South Africa through the co-option of those 
close to the democratic enougn sway to deliver at 
least some o~ its less oolitic:ised constituency to supoort continued 
The degree to which it succeeds will deoend o~ the 
level of that takes state cower, as 
well and 
democratic organisation, that will not be oar~y to such a scheme. 
Tht? th f.~O!'" (',~t. :i. c::"" 1 ·i- <-~ ••• +· '··· I l ~:;t. · ... oeoan ~nis oaoer suqges~ed that the 
political pos1tion t.na.t. a class adoots in struggle cannot simply be 
read off from its pos1tion in relation to the means of orocuction. 
oolitical position its :i.nto the 
entire oo:Liticc:d ,:,\nd :i.deoloqiG'l.l rel a.t. ions o·f 
domi nat j, em" tha.t cnaracterise the social formation. this 
level cJ't~ abstraction, one cannot ioentify 'classes• in operation as 
one can thf.? i.e-.../.-:~ l the F~r-cJcjLtct :i. c.1n =' !' 
nevertheless empirically observable social \]i'"OUp·5 whose pol it i ca.:L 
behaviour is determined 'in the last instance' by their relation to 
the means of production. 
Such an observable grouping is the 'asoirant African bourgeoisie'; 
a bourgeoisie because it own:s and controls the means of production to 
a limited because as ye~ it's access to political 
powe1~ i ·s 1 i ;ni tee] 1: he s;.t!'"U.•:::. t Ui'" ,:.,j_ cont.!"- a.d i ct ion traversing the form 
of sta~e~ the dominant contradiction between oopressor ano oppressed. 
The orthodox aporoach to the South African revolution~ as developed 
and sophisticated o·f this '' Cu 1 on i .:;.1 i ~'31Ti o+ 
c:ocnmona.1 i ty o+ i ntel·-f.?sts o·f all 
oppresseo classes~ and the oossibilitv and poli~ical necessity of the 
uni~y o; a11 op~ressed classes 1n national-democratic struggle. 
The "r-e+ or-·m •• 
par·c 1 E:i . .L 
centrally directed at orogrammatically addressing t~e organic crisis 
afflicting til.,·? social forma~ion as a wnole. esoecially the crisis of 
legitimacy the state faced oppressed, who had united 
across class joundaries under of Black Consciousness in 
the 70's. Central to state strategy was the exacerbation of divisions 
between the oocressed, along ethnic~ geographical and class lines. 
Thus monopoly capital and the state embarked on a camo~'-i gn to 
identi ·fy· and 
as promote support from that class for top-down reform. 
We ha\/e discussed aspects of the history of the prime 
representative of the 1'i:Jla.c:k rnJ.cJdle cJ.a.·5s''~~ ·rni·:; WCJI . .J.ld indica.te that 
one cannot reduce NAFCOC~ even in the relative quiet of the early and 
to a lap-dog of state and capital. On the contrary. NAFCOC 
has consistently defended its independence and sought out avenues for 
the advancement of the class interests of its membershio. While for a 
NAFCDC members were served through 
partici~:.1aticm in state structures, neither NAFCOC as a whole nor the 
whole aspirant African bourgeoisie have ever allowed themselves to be 
The ·t <::\C: -r:. i::i-·; a.t. 
constituent classes renders the tne raporochement t:ietween 
.~' 
ri tsel + and ~~e or·qanisations o+ ~~e wor~1ng masses ooliticallv 
important: tG wna~ excen~ can the organ1sat1on oe relied on in a 
formal alllance7 How consis~en~ w1il t~e m1dcle classes be in the 
revolutionary alliance 7 1s ~ne par~1c1pation of these classes narrow 
do they nave an oojective 1nterest in national 
The discussion we have gone through indicates two things. Firstly 
tha.t the NAFCOC are opposed to those of the state and 
capital not only politically, but also economically: tha.t the 
aspirant African Bourgeoisie has an interest in the overthrow of 
monopoly capital and the democratisation of the economy. 
Secondly, in areas where the oppressed have forged cross-class 
unity and begun to develop alternative democratic governmental 
structures, the asoirant oourgeoisie have been drawn into mass 
campaigns and are subordinating themselves to a degree to the 
democratic will of the community. 
As the structural economic crisis in South Africa intensifies, the 
contradiction between the interests of competitive African capital 
and thosf? of monopoly capital will making any durable 
alliance between the two impossible, and forcing NAFCOC and other 
organ1sat1ons to support the anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist 
dimensions of tne national-democratic struggle. 
l 
w1tn a word of cau~1on: wh1ie ~he 
or1nc1Ple 3~rateqic OClective 1n this, tn9 f1rst stage 
o+ tht::! Lt l! .i. n t. {::·:-~ ! .... t' : ... i. p t. (·?:~ G 
1 i i:J t:.'r at i em a.>l c t ilf-2 .,:tt -c.C:tl nmen t. of an independent~ socialist-oriented 
conditions under which that and 
degree of democratic practice that ~~ achieved depends on the ability 
wo~king class to attain hegemony over the united 
front. While there are no (and can ce no) guarantees in struggle, the 
part i c i pa.t i em of oppi·-e:.ssecl c:1 a.·5·ses in be 
subcw·di na.ted to the discipline of the vanguard of that struggle, and 
independent agendas and divisive activity cannot be ignored. 
r 
r 
e.F..:f' E NP ~)L .... t 
<Breakdown of reoresentat1ve samole of 
NAFCOC members by occuoation- December 1986.) 
_____ s._~_t.f~.9..Q!:.Y. ...... ---··--·-···---·-···--··-------····-··-·----··--·-·--·------·----~l~.~QJ_t;lt~:. 
1. F\estaur.;.3.nt 
2. General Dealer 
3. Da.ir\/ 
4. Butcher 
5. Bottle ~3tor-e 
6. Constt~uct ion 
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President of NAFCOC 
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Yusuf Pa~1ad 
Executive member of Western Caoe Traders Association 
!"iashudu F{amano 
Features ~dltor. Hlrican Business 
Director Association of Black Accountants of South Africa 
Clive Sti'-2\ml--ooci 
Advertising Manager for African Business in Western Cape 
l"ial~ k Swi 11 i ng 
Member of Community Research Group 
Lecturer in Political Studies Dept, Wits 
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